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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the effect of female board representation on the probability that a firm 
will appoint a woman to the CEO position. To study the relationship, I first draw on social 
identity theory to explain female directors’ preference for a female CEO candidate. Then, 
considering that female directors’ minority status may constrain their ability to affect group 
decisions, I supplement social identity theory with critical mass theory to argue that increasing 
the number of female directors beyond a certain point will empower them to become more 
influential in CEO appointment decisions, and this empowerment, in turn, will increase the 
likelihood that firms will appoint a female CEO. Furthermore, I argue that the positive effect of 
female board representation on the probability of women being appointed to the CEO position is 
stronger under two organizational conditions: (1) when directors have an opportunity to observe 
or work with women in the upper echelons of other firms through board interlock ties and (2) 
when the organization or industry has a higher-level of female-friendliness. I test this argument 
by analyzing 1,096 CEO succession events in large United States firms from 1998 to 2012. I 
found that the likelihood of appointing a female CEO significantly rises once the board has three 
female directors. The results also demonstrate that the relationship between the proportion of 
female directors and the likelihood of appointing a female CEO is stronger when directors have 
interlock ties with firms having women in the upper echelons and when the firm and the industry 
the firm belongs to have a high proportion of female executive managers. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Around the world, the call for gender diversity in corporate boards is louder than ever 
before. Starting with Norway, many European countries, such as Germany, France, Spain, and 
the Netherlands, have been introducing mandatory quotas to enhance female representation on 
corporate boards (Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2014). In the United States, while quotas are not 
being considered to resolve the issue of the lack of women on boards, shareholder resolutions 
and the media play a primary role in promoting the value of gender diversity on boards in 
organizations. With this increased attention, many studies have examined the effect of board 
gender diversity on various organizational outcomes such as firm performance (Campbell & 
Minguez-Vera, 2010; Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Srinidhi, Gul & Tsui, 2011), corporate strategy and 
innovation (Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2013; Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Torchia, Calabro, & 
Huse, 2011), and corporate social responsibility (Boulouta, 2013; Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, & 
Ruiz, 2012; Marquis & Lee, 2013; Post, Rahman, & Rubow, 2011; Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 
2012; Zhang, Zhu, & Ding, 2013).  
The empirical evidence, however, has been surprisingly inconsistent. For example, while 
some demonstrated positive effect of board gender diversity on accounting and market reactions 
(e.g., Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2010; Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Srinidhi, Gul & Tsui, 2011), other 
studies uncovered negative relationships (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; 
Bøhren & Strøm, 2010), or no relationship (e.g, Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; 
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Chapple & Humphrey, 2013). A big part of these mixed findings can be attributed to an 
important fact which has been overlooked in those studies: with diversity comes inequality. 
Groups in the upper echelons of the corporate pyramid, such as boards of directors and top 
management teams, are heavily dominated by white men. Women and racial minorities are often 
a demographic and numeric minority. The disparities in demographic status and number between 
a majority group and a minority group likely impede the extent to which minorities can 
contribute to firm outcomes. Therefore, the research on diversity in upper echelon groups should 
also include an examination of inequality.  
To close this gap in the literature, this dissertation examines organizational factors that 
strengthen or weaken the effect of female directors, a minority on boards, on an important 
organizational outcome: CEO succession. The basic assumption is that female board 
representation is positively associated with the likelihood that a firm will appoint a woman to the 
CEO position. I establish female board representation as a primary driver behind the appointment 
of a female CEO for two reasons. First, CEO appointment is largely determined by the board of 
directors. Because of the direct linkage between boards and CEO appointment, corporate boards 
provide an excellent context to study the relationship between female board representation and 
female CEO appointment. Second, social identity theory, which argues the existence of in-group 
favoritism among people from the same demographic groups, offers a solid theoretical 
explanation for female directors’ preference for a female CEO candidate.  
Female directors’ preference, however, may not necessarily affect the likelihood of a 
female CEO appointment because CEO hiring decisions are made by the board at the group level 
and female directors’ demographic and numeric minority status is likely to limit their ability to 
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influence appointment decisions made by the group. According to status-related theories, such as 
expectation states, role congruity, and social dominance theory, status differences between men 
and women constrain female members’ behaviors in group decisions (Correll & Ridgeway, 
2006; Ely & Thomas, 2001; Kulich, Ryan, & Haslam, 2007; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). A 
fundamental tenet of these theories is that status differences are related to stereotypes such that 
positive stereotypes are typically associated with high-status group members while negative 
stereotypes are often related to low status members. For example, while white men are typically 
associated with leadership positions or a prestige education, women or people of color are often 
associated with menial jobs and inferior education. These stereotypes reinforce status differences 
between the two groups by empowering majorities to exert more power while simultaneously 
pressuring minorities to remain quiet in group decisions. In addition to the status inferiority, 
female directors are a numeric minority on most U.S. boards. Due to their status as a 
demographic and numeric minority, their desire to support a female CEO candidate may fail to 
affect an actual CEO appointment.  
Considering this unfavorable reality faced by female directors, I examine conditions 
under which the effect of female board representation on the likelihood that a firm will appoint a 
woman to the CEO position can be maximized. Specifically, I first argue that the positive effect 
of female directors on appointing a female CEO is realized when their numeric inferiority is 
overcome by reaching a certain point, which is a critical mass. Furthermore, I argue that female 
directors can exert stronger influence on CEO succession when negative gender stereotypes, 
which is associated with their demographic group, is mitigated by some contextual factors: 
directors’ network with other firms having women at the top, upper echelon culture, and industry 
gender norm. 
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The present study extends the research on the upper echelons, CEO succession, and board 
of directors in several ways. First, the unique contribution of this dissertation is to extend the 
research on diversity in upper echelon groups, such as boards of directors and top management 
teams, by integrating the literature on diversity and inequality. This study further contributes to 
the research on group diversity in the upper echelons by suggesting effective ways to empower 
minorities in group decisions: increasing the number of minority members beyond a critical mass 
and decreasing negative gender stereotypes about female directors. According to DiTomaso, 
Post, and Parks-Yancy (2007), the negative effects of group inequality in the upper echelons 
create the need for a deeper understanding of the circumstances under which social minorities 
become more influential in group decisions. Given that female directors’ minority status often 
limit their influence on boards, I first draw on critical mass theory and argue that increasing the 
number of female directors to a critical mass of three will help them transfer their desire to 
support a female CEO candidate into an ability to affect actual CEO appointment decisions, 
which in turn will increase the likelihood of appointing a female CEO. The results demonstrate 
that the effect of female board representation on the likelihood of appointing a female CEO 
becomes positive and statistically significant only when there are three or more female directors 
on boards. Then, I also argue that mitigating negative gender stereotypes will help female 
directors become more influential in group decisions. The results show that the positive effect of 
female board representation on female CEO appointment is stronger when directors have more 
experience working with women in the upper echelons through interlocking directorates, and 
when the firm and industry have more female-friendly culture and norms. Understanding these 
effects will clarify organizational conditions under which the constraint created by women’s 
minority status can be overcome and the effect of board gender diversity can be maximized. 
  5 
Second, this study extends the literature on women in the upper echelons by examining 
how women can help other women in hiring decisions in the upper echelons. It is a popular 
tendency that people prefer to work with demographically similar others and evaluate them more 
favorably in hiring and promotion decisions. The assumption of in-group favoritism, which is a 
core argument of theories in social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and similarity-attraction 
(Byrne, 1971; O'Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989; Tsui & O'Reilly, 1989), has been supported 
by a substantial body of empirical research (i.e., Graves & Powell, 1996; Kaczmarek, Kimino, & 
Pye, 2012; O’Reilly & Main, 2010; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Young & Buchholtz, 2002; Zajac 
& Westphal, 1996; Zhang, Ji, Tao, & Wang, 2011). In a similar vein, a variety of scholars and 
practitioners have suggested that women and racial minorities in the upper echelons will support 
demographically similar others as potential work group peers (Ely, 1994; Ibarra, 1995; Ragins & 
Scandura, 1999; Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). However, there have been relatively few 
attempts to empirically test the assumption that women will advocate for similar others in high-
prestige work groups (Duguid, Loyd, & Tolbert., 2012). Duguid and her colleagues (2012) point 
out that “whether women and minorities can serve as active change agents (to expand diversity) 
in the upper echelons of organizations, and under what conditions, have remained underexplored 
issues.” (p.396) This dissertation addresses the gap by demonstrating that female directors can 
have a positive influence on female CEO appointment when they reach a critical mass of three.  
Third, this study extends the research about CEO succession by exploring female board 
representation as an important organizational predictor of female CEO appointment. As noted 
above, the question of under what organization-level conditions a firm is likely to appoint a 
female CEO has remained underexplored. While a small body of research has examined when 
women are more likely to be promoted to the upper level (Cohen, Broschak, & Haveman, 1998; 
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Gorman, 2006), little is known about determinants of a female CEO appointment. One exception 
is Cook and Glass (2013) who draw on glass cliff theory and demonstrate that weakly 
performing firms are more likely than firms with strong performance to hire women or racial 
minorities as the CEO. The present study further contributes to this stream of research by 
focusing on female board representation as another organizational factor affecting female CEO 
appointment.  
Fourth, this study contributes to the research on boards of directors. As noted earlier, the 
findings of the studies on the effect of board gender diversity on firm outcomes are inconsistent. 
Beyond overlooking status differences between male and female directors, this inconsistency can 
also be partially attributed to the use of somewhat distal outcomes (i.e., firm performance, firm 
innovation, firm strategy, corporate social responsibility). These firm outcomes are affected by 
other numerous predictors, besides the board of directors, and these confounding factors could 
make the relationships spurious. The present study mitigates this issue by studying CEO 
appointment as the dependent variable. Unlike other firm outcomes used in previous studies, 
CEO appointment is largely determined by boards of directors and thus less noise exists in the 
relationship. 
Lastly, this study offers a practical implication to firms interested in increasing female 
representation in the upper echelons by demonstrating that the critical mass of female directors 
can contribute to increasing the likelihood of appointing a female CEO, which in turn will 
increase the inclusion of other women in high-level positions. Given that many firms hire female 
directors as tokens, the finding of this study—the effect of board gender diversity can be realized 
only when there are three or more female directors—shows the need to increase female board 
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representation beyond the critical mass. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that female 
directors can exert greater influence on board decisions when negative gender stereotypes about 
women are lower and gender diversity is more valued. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1 APPOINTING MINORITIES TO LEADERSHIP POSITIONS 
It is well known that women and racial minorities are much less likely to hold leadership 
positions compared to white men, even after controlling for education, experience, and 
occupation (McGuire & Reskin, 1993; Smith, 1999, 2001). The underrepresentation of 
minorities in leadership positions can be attributed to several cultural and structural barriers, 
including bias and discrimination (Bielby, 2000; Jacobs, 1992; Reskin, 2002, 2005), exclusion 
from professional and informal networks (Ibarra 1993, 1995, Mcguire, 2002), and the lack of 
mentoring (Blake-Beard, 2001; Martin, 1994).  
Among these barriers, bias and discrimination are the most fundamental factors that 
prevent minorities from achieving leadership positions, which leads to other hurdles for the 
minorities. Minorities often face bias and discrimination in hiring and promotion decisions, 
mostly due to negative stereotypes associated with their demographic groups (i.e., gender, 
ethnicity). Bias and discrimination become a bigger roadblock for minorities when the hiring and 
promotion decisions are related to leadership positions. According to theories about expectation 
states (Berger, Conner, & Fisek, 1982; Correll & Ridgeway, 2006) and role congruity (Eagly, 
Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Ely & Thomas, 2001), men are often assumed to possess positive 
qualities required for leadership positions while women and racial minorities are considered to 
be inferior to men and not suitable for such high-level positions. Also, typical characteristics of 
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leadership positions, such as vague job responsibilities and uncertain skill requirements, allow 
decision-makers (i.e., the board of directors) considerable latitude in the appointment process 
(Cook & Glass, 2013; Gorman, 2006; Smith, 2002; Ridgeway, 1997). The discretion naturally 
leads them to utilize candidates’ demographic characteristics, highly visible and salient aspects, 
as a primary evaluation criterion, which gives more advantages to majority candidates (i.e., white 
men) while depriving minority candidates (i.e., women, racial minorities) of opportunities to 
climb to the top of the corporate ladder. As a result, majorities’ chances of being promoted to 
leadership positions are significantly higher than those of minorities. 
The dominance of white men in leadership positions, which is caused by bias and 
discrimination toward women and racial minorities, creates other disadvantages for the 
minorities such as exclusion from professional and informal networks and the lack of quality 
mentoring. According to social network theory, networks play a crucial role in recruiting and 
hiring decisions (Granovetter, 2005; Ibarra, 1995). Due to the limited pool of minorities in high-
level positions of organizations, however, minorities have fewer social and professional network 
relationships, compared to white men. The network deficits further restrict minorities’ access to 
resources and information related to job opportunities in the upper echelons. Similarly, the 
limited networks also mean smaller chances to experience formal and informal mentoring, which 
has been suggested as one way of helping minorities break glass ceiling and achieve high-level 
positions (Ragins, 1997; Ragins & Cotton, 1999; Ragins, Townsend, & Mattis, 1998). 
 While previous studies have focused on the barriers to mobility of minorities, 
organizational factors that increase the probability of minorities being appointed to leadership 
positions remain underexplored (Cook & Glass 2014). A small but growing body of scholarship 
  10 
has examined organizational factors that help minorities overcome the barriers (Cohen, 
Broschak, & Haveman, 1998; Cook & Glass, 2014; Ely, 1994; Gorman, 2006; Matsa & Miller, 
2011; Ryan & Haslam, 2007). However, most studies in this stream of research examine the odds 
of minorities being promoted or appointed to managerial positions and little attempt has been 
made to study the probability of minorities being tabbed for the CEO position. As a few 
exceptions, Ryan and Haslam (2007) and Cook and Glass (2014) draw on glass cliff theory and 
demonstrate that firms facing precarious situations are likely to appoint female CEOs over male 
CEOs, compared to firms in good shape. This dissertation contributes to this relatively inchoate 
scholarship by examining female board representation as an important organizational predictor 
of appointing a woman to the CEO position. Female board composition is an excellent 
organizational predictor of female CEO appointment due to the characteristics of boards and 
gender. Corporate boards play a crucial role in CEO appointment. The clear and direct 
relationship between boards and CEO appointment makes the board of directors a stable 
organizational predictor of female CEO appointment. Furthermore, when the role of gender is 
laid over the basic framework of boards and CEO appointment, social identity theory provides a 
solid theoretical foundation for female directors’ preference for a female CEO candidate. 
 
2.2. UNDERLYING MECHANISMS OF IN-GROUP FAVORITISM IN THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIRECTORS AND A CEO CANDIDATE 
A substantial body of research on performance evaluation and hiring practices has shown 
that demographic similarity increases interpersonal interaction (Byrne, Clore, & Worchel, 1966; 
Judge & Ferris, 1993; Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989) and produce bias in hiring and evaluation 
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decisions (e.g., Latham, Wexley, & Pursell, 1975; Rand & Wexley, 1975; Zajac & Westphal, 
1996), mostly drawing on theories in social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), social 
categorization (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1987), and similarity-attraction (Bryne, 1971; O’Reilly, 
Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989). Social identity theorists suggest that individuals derive self-esteem 
and self-identity from perceived group membership, and thus often seek to construct or maintain 
homogeneous groups in order to increase the salience of in-group membership (Tajfel & Terner, 
1986; Tsui, Egan, & O’Reilly, 1992). Social identity theory is further built on social 
categorization theory, which argues that in-group favoritism also mitigates uncertainty about 
oneself (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner, 1987). Since demographic similarity is often utilized as 
a salient basis for group membership, individuals may prefer to work with demographically 
similar individuals and favor them in promotions and hiring decisions (Useem & Karabel, 1986).  
The same logic may apply to the relationship between directors and a CEO successor. 
Given the unavoidable ambiguities and uncertainties of a CEO successor’s potential 
performance, directors may utilize demographic similarity as an important evaluation criterion to 
minimize social uncertainty (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Zajac and Westphal (1996) argue that 
boards may favor demographically similar CEO successors in order to ensure efficient and 
frequent communication with the CEO and, more generally, to enhance social integration. As a 
minority in the male-dominated world, female directors have a stronger motivation to support a 
female CEO candidate. Furthermore, hiring a female CEO may facilitate the increase of the 
number of women in the upper echelons including female directors, which could help those 
women build their presence and access more resources and information (Ibarra, 1992; Rogers & 
Kincaid, 1981). Thus, I predict that the greater the number of female directors on board, the 
higher the probability that the firm will choose a female CEO. 
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 Hypothesis1. The proportion of female directors is positively associated with the 
likelihood that a firm will appoint a female CEO. 
 
2.3 THE EFFECT OF MINORITY STATUS ON GROUP PARTICIPATION  
Theories about social identity, social categorization, similarity-attraction, and homophily 
provide reasonable support for female directors’ preference for a female CEO candidate, as 
predicted in Hypothesis 1. Considering that female directors’ numeric and demographic minority 
status may limit their behavior and influence on board decisions, however, it is important to take 
a closer look at the relationship between female board representation and the likelihood of 
appointing a female CEO. The literature on organizational demography and social conformity 
questions the extent to which demographic minorities can affect group decisions (Westphal & 
Milton, 2000). A core argument of this literature is that status differences in a group reduce 
social cohesion between the majority and minorities, which decrease the possibility that 
minorities’ thoughts and opinions will be incorporated into group decisions (Hambrick, Cho, & 
Chen, 1996; Nemeth, 1986; O'Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989).  
This literature partially draws on intergroup theories explaining that intergroup inequality 
results in stigmatization, prejudice, discrimination, and pressures on less powerful groups to 
assimilate to the norms of the powerful group (Linnehan & Konrad, 1999). In a similar vein, 
research on team diversity suggests that diverse teams may include hierarchical stratification 
among different subgroups where members of one subgroup possess extreme power and those of 
another subgroup have little power (Carton & Cummings, 2012). In this case, members of the 
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subordinate subgroup may experience some degree of identity threat from members of the 
dominant subgroups (Carton & Cummings, 2012; Duguid et al., 2012). They also may feel that 
their ability to comfortably express their viewpoints is undermined by the prominence of the 
dominant subgroup (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000).   
Specifically, in the context of gender, expectation states theory argues that gender 
stereotypes contain status beliefs that associate greater social significance and competence with 
men than women (Berger, Conner, & Fisek, 1982; Correll & Ridgeway, 2006). Similarly, role 
congruity theory, which has been frequently used to explain gender difference in leadership 
roles, posits that women are perceived to lack abilities and attributes required for managerial 
positions compared to men (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Ely & Thomas, 2001; Kulich, 
Ryan, & Haslam, 2007). For these reasons, women often face stricter standards and are evaluated 
less positively by men (Correll & Ridgeway, 2006). For the board of directors, therefore, if a 
board has both male and female directors, female directors are likely to face barriers to exert 
influence in group decisions due to their minority status.  
The reality of inequality becomes more salient when the demographic minority members 
are also a numeric minority. According to Kanter (1977a), minorities who constitute less than 15 
percent of a group are a “skewed group” and the minority members are “tokens.” Generally, 
tokenism is highly associated with limited opportunities and low power because of the rarity and 
low status of tokens. On most U.S. boards, which are traditionally dominated by white males 
(Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 2002), female directors are not only a demographic minority but 
also a numeric minority, namely tokens.  In 2013, women held only 16.9 percent of the corporate 
board seats (Catalyst, 2013). Also, about 90 percent of Fortune 1000 firms have fewer than three 
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female directors on boards (Post et al., 2011). Because of their rarity, male directors tend to view 
them as representations of all women rather than as individuals. Thus, they easily project their 
idea about women’s low status and inferiority to the female directors, and stereotype them as less 
competent and unsuitable for such positions (Kanter, 1977a). Besides, external pressures from 
institutional investors, shareholders, or policy makers to appoint female directors on boards make 
male directors to suspect the possibility of preferential selection and treatment of female 
directors.  
Taken together, a combination of the two factors—status difference and numeric 
inequality—is likely to give male directors greater power while constraining female directors’ 
behavior. For this reason, female directors often feel invisible, ignored, dismissed, or otherwise 
excluded by male directors (Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008). These experiences make them feel 
estranged in the process of assimilation and not be able to voice or make tangible changes 
(Konrad et al., 2008). Especially, this male-dominated group setting limits female directors’ 
ability to exhibit explicit display of in-group favoritism because advocating for in-group 
members (i.e., female CEO candidates) may jeopardize female directors’ career and reputation in 
the boardroom. As a result, female directors’ actions and choices in favor of other women (i.e., 
female CEO candidates) are likely to be constrained regardless of their desire to support in-group 
members (Duguid et al., 2012).  
Considering the differences of status and number between majorities and minorities, 
therefore, I suggest how to overcome the disadvantages caused by the differences. I first draw on 
critical mass theory and argue that a critical mass of female directors may empower them to exert 
greater influence in CEO succession process, which likely increases the probability that a woman 
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will be appointed as the CEO. Also, I argue that the positive effect of female board 
representation on female CEO succession is stronger when negative gender stereotypes are 
mitigated and positive value of gender diversity is emphasized by (1) board interlock ties that 
allow directors observe or work with women at the top of other firms and (2) female-friendliness 
in the upper echelons and in the industry. 
 
2.4 OVERCOMING NEMERIC INFERIORITY: THE IMPACT OF A CRITICAL MASS OF 
FEMALE DIRECTORS 
The unfavorable situation for female directors, a minority on boards, might change when 
their number increases beyond a certain point, which is the critical mass. Classic work within 
sociology suggests that the degree of inequality among members in diverse groups is affected by 
three dimensions: power, status, and numbers (Bendix & Lipset, 1954; Blalock, 1967; DiTomaso 
et al., 2007). In this dissertation, following DiTomaso and her colleagues (2007: 475), I define 
power as “the access to and control over scarce and valuable resources,” status as “the 
relationships of deference or honor between and among groups,” and numbers as “the 
compositional characteristics of a group or work unit.”   The three dimensions exist as separate 
characteristics, but they are indeed all intertwined. In organizations, for example, power and 
status are often aligned although not perfectly the same (DiTomaso at al., 2007). Also, number is 
associated with power such that numeric inferiority of a subgroup usually means low power of 
the group (Kanter, 1977a).  
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Under the assumption that the three dimensions of power, status, and number are closely 
related and collectively affect the degree of inequality among group members, I propose that the 
inequality caused by minority members’ deficit in one or more dimensions can be reduced by 
strengthening the other dimensions. For the board of directors, female directors are an inherently 
demographic and situationally numeric minority on boards. The lower demographic status and 
smaller number, compared to their male counterparts, limits the degree of power they can exert 
in group decisions. The inferiorities in status, number, and power, in turn, contribute to widening 
the degree of inequality between male and female directors. This inequality, however, can be 
somewhat reduced with an increase in the number of female directors, which is, in turn, likely to 
increase the degree of power they can exert in group decisions. Although modifying any 
dimension will have ripple effects on the other dimensions, I argue that changing number is the 
easiest and most direct point of augmentation. First, unlike status, especially demographic status 
which is tied with inherent traits like sex and race, number is more malleable. Second, altering 
the degree of individual power requires individualized effort over an extensive period of time. 
Further still, such an increase in power cannot be guaranteed. In contrast, number is decided at 
the organizational level and can be adjusted within shorter timeframes. Thus, an attempt to 
increase the number of women on a board can be relatively easily achieved. 
Critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977a, b, 1987; Granovetter, 1978) can explain how 
increasing representation plays a crucial role in reducing inequality between minorities and 
majorities in a group. The basic argument of critical mass theory is that increasing the size of a 
subgroup to a certain threshold substantially increases the degree of the subgroup power (Torchia 
et al., 2011). The critical mass can also be explained with the notion of the “tipping point.” 
Although there is no academically agreed definition, the tipping point, which was first used by 
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Grodzins (1957) and expanded by Schelling (1971), generally refers to a critical moment in an 
evolving situation, process, or system that leads to rapid and dramatic changes. In his book, 
Gladwell (2006, p.12) defines the tipping point as “the magic moment when an idea, trend, or 
social behavior crosses a threshold, tips, and spreads like wildfire.” In diverse work groups 
where status differences create inequality among members, minority members have little chance 
to exert influence on the group. However, when their number reaches a certain threshold, they 
become an influential body that can shift group culture and the relationships of the team 
members, and affect group decisions. Based on these arguments, I predict that the positive effect 
of the presence of female directors on the likelihood of women being appointed to the CEO 
position is realized only when the number of female directors reaches a certain threshold, which 
is a critical mass. 
Hypothesis 2. There will be an inflection point where the effect of the number of female 
directors on the likelihood of women being appointed to the CEO position will change 
from null to significant.  
 
2.5 OVERCOMING STATUS INFERIORITY: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
 In addition to increasing the number of female directors beyond a certain point, a critical 
mass, boardroom dynamics unfavorable to female directors can also be modified by other 
organizational factors that decrease negative perceptions about women or emphasize the value of 
gender diversity. The literature in social psychology and sociology recognizes that minority 
status can vary across situations and over time, depending on the immediate social context 
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(Westphal & Milton, 2000). Drawing on this argument, I explore factors that can empower 
female directors to become more influential in the CEO succession process. Specifically, I argue 
that female directors have a greater influence on the likelihood of appointing a female CEO 
when 1) directors have an opportunity to observe or work with women in the upper echelons of 
other firms through board interlock ties, which likely mitigates negative perceptions about 
women; and 2) when the organization or industry has a higher level of female-friendliness, 
which provides a more equal playing field for both male and female directors. 
2.5.1 Board Interlock Ties with Firms Having Women in the Upper Echelons 
The literature on interlocking directorates—a practice of members of a corporate board of 
directors serving on the boards of multiple corporations—argues that new information, 
innovations, organizational structures and strategic practices are diffused to other organizations 
through ties with directors sitting on their boards (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Davis, 1991; 
Haunschild, 1993; Mizruchi, 1992; O'Reilly III, Main, & Crystal, 1988; Palmer, Jennings, & 
Zhou, 1993). Despite its relative dearth, the representation of women in high-level positions has 
significantly increased in the past 20 years (Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Ryan & Haslam, 2007). The 
success of these women can signal that women may be equally competent and qualified for 
leadership positions, just as their male competitors. This signal can be diffused to other firms 
through board interlock ties. If directors observe or work with women in the upper echelons of 
other firms through board interlock ties, that experience will affect their view about women in a 
positive way. This learning will likely change their attitude about female members on the same 
board, which in turn will help the female directors become more influential in board decisions. 
  19 
The reason for the effect of board interlocks may be different for men and women. For 
male directors, the experience through board interlocks may change their view about women. 
According to contact hypothesis theory, interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways 
to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members (Allport, 1954). If male 
directors reduce negative gender stereotypes about women, it will help them respect female 
directors’ opinions. For female directors, the same experience will enhance positive feelings 
about their group membership. This can increase their level of confidence and self-esteem, and 
will help them speak up and be more active in group decisions. The power of board interlock ties 
becomes even stronger when the directors share their learning with other directors on the same 
boards. Based on these arguments, I predict that directors become aware of the existence of 
competent women in the high-level positions of other firms through interlocking board 
membership and that could contribute to men’s casting aside gender-role stereotypes and 
generalizations. This same interaction may also lead to a more positive evaluation from women 
toward other females in high-level positions. 
 While the present dissertation views organizational learning and information diffusion 
through interlocking directorates as an underlying mechanism between female representation on 
a board and a firm’s appointment of a female CEO, one can also posit that female-friendly firms 
may appoint directors who explicitly signal the same perspective, and thus those firms and 
directors are interconnected through board interlock ties. In this case, the black box between 
board interlock ties and firms’ appointment of a female CEO can be explained by the firm and 
directors’ preference for females in managerial positions rather than by information diffusion and 
organizational learning through board interlock ties. Either explanation will lead to the same 
hypothesis. Synthesizing the above:   
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Hypothesis 3a. The positive effect of the proportion of female directors on the likelihood 
that a firm will appoint a female CEO is greater as more male directors have more board 
interlocks with other firms having female directors, executives, or CEOs increases. 
Hypothesis 3b. The positive effect of the proportion of female directors on the likelihood 
that a firm will appoint a female CEO is greater as more female directors have more 
board interlocks with other firms having female directors, executives, or CEOs increases. 
2.5.2 Female Representation in Top Managerial Positions  
In addition to the board interlock ties with other firms having women at the top, which 
may decrease male directors’ negative viewpoints about women and enhance female directors’ 
positive perception about their own demographic group (i.e., gender), female friendliness in the 
upper echelons is another important contextual mechanism that can play a significant role in 
empowering female directors to exert more influence in group decision making.  As noted 
earlier, the upper echelons of most US firms are dominated by white males, and thus the 
organizational culture, especially upper echelon culture of these firms tends to reflect their 
masculine characteristics and acts in their favor. This predominantly male culture often prevents 
women from voicing and exerting influence in organizations, which in turn limits various 
opportunities available to them. According to Ragins, Townsend, and Mattis (1998), female 
executives consider inhospitable and exclusionary corporate cultures for women as one of the 
biggest obstacles to their advancement in organizations. However, if organizational culture is 
more female-friendly, female directors may be less afraid of speaking up and their opinions and 
thoughts are more likely to be respected by male members. Based on these arguments, I predict 
that female-friendliness in the upper echelons will reduce gender stereotypes and provide women 
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with greater power in group decision making by creating a relatively equal playing field for both 
male and female directors.  
Specifically, I use the proportion of women at the top management positions as a proxy to 
measure female-friendliness in the upper echelons. Considering that a majority of directors on 
US boards are outsiders, it is possible to assume that boardroom culture is different from 
management culture. However, I assume that the two cultures are related for two reasons. First, 
according to Bednar (2012), although most boards maintain formal independence, they may lack 
social independence. Boards have formal independence if directors do not have employment, 
family, or business relationships with the firm where they serve as directors (Anderson & Reeb, 
2004). In contrast, boards have social independence if the directors are not related to the firm or 
its CEO either through demographic characteristics (e.g., age, functional background, industry 
experience) or through board interlocks or educational ties. Most firms care only about formal 
independence and ignore social independence because formal independence is what external 
parties, such as the media and shareholder, pay close attention to. Thus, it is difficult to say that 
US boards are completely independent from management. Accordingly, it is also difficult to 
assume that boardroom and top management cultures are independent. Second, director 
nomination is often influenced by 1) CEOs and 2) incumbent directors who were appointed by 
the CEOs or are a part of top management teams. Thus, it is highly likely that boardroom culture 
is affected by management. Based on these arguments, I use female-friendliness in top 
management as a proxy for female-friendliness in boardrooms.  
Female representation in top management can be “a proxy for the organization’s 
unobserved cultural and institutional characteristics, such as female-friendliness or an egalitarian 
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culture” (Shin, 2012: 262). There are two possible explanations. First, firms with a female-
friendly or egalitarian culture are likely to have more women in top management positions. 
These firms are more active in hiring women, and at the same time appear more attractive to 
women in external labor markets. Second, women in top management can contribute to creating 
and maintaining female-friendly corporate culture by serving as role models for other women in 
the organization and by helping to reduce unfavorable stereotypes about their demographic 
category (Duguid, Loyd, & Tolbert, 2012). Although it is hard to argue the causal direction 
between top management gender composition and female-friendliness in the upper echelons, 
either argument explains the correlation between the two.  
Based on these arguments, therefore, I propose that the proportion of women in top 
executive positions can be a proxy for a firm’s preference for hiring women in the upper 
echelons and it will positively moderate the relationship between female board representation 
and the likelihood of appointing a female CEO. 
Hypothesis 4a. The proportion of female directors is more positively related to the 
likelihood that a firm will appoint a female CEO when there are more women in top 
executive positions. 
2.5.3 Female Executive Representation in the Industry 
Similar to female representation in the upper echelons of firms, female representation in 
top management of the industry which the firm belongs to can also be a proxy for female 
friendliness of the upper echelons or that of the entire firm. Each industry has different gender 
norms depending on its characteristics (i.e., customer base, nature of business), and organizations 
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in the same industry often follow the same gender norms. Scholars argue that firms within the 
same industry are likely to adopt similar organizational practices or structures in order to meet 
societal expectation and ensure organizational stability (Adams, Gupta, & Leeth, 2010; Knippen 
& Shen, 2009). For example, Knippen and Shen (2009) found that the firm-level board gender 
composition is positively associated with the industry-level board gender composition.  
These studies primarily draw on institutional theory, which argues that organizations 
conform to prevailing institutional norms and belief systems in order to enhance legitimacy and 
avoid uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Scott (1995) suggests 
three different mechanisms—labeled as “three pillars”—that explain the individuals and 
organizations’ conformity to institutional norms and rules: regulative, normative, and cultural-
cognitive. Among these mechanisms, cultural-cognitive perspective, which is an important 
contribution and a major distinguishing feature of neoinsitutionalism, provides a theoretical 
explanation for organizations’ conformity to the gender norms of the industry in which they are 
located. Institutionalists in the fields of sociology and organizational theory view the centrality of 
cultural-cognitive elements of institutions as “the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of 
social reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (Scott 1995, p. 57). This cultural-
cognitive perspective argues that actors—both individual and collective—follow common beliefs 
or shared logic of action that they perceive as culturally supported, in order to enhance 
legitimacy and avoid uncertainty, which in turn helps them feel competent and connected. This 
logic implies that firms in industries that emphasize the value of female-friendliness or gender 
diversity are likely to follow or pretend to follow the same value within their organizations to 
feel connected and secure.  
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Industry characteristics shared by firms in the same industry expose the firms to similar 
cultural expectations about gender norms and to the same kinds of and pressure from various 
constituencies, including shareholders, customers, and the media, to hire more women in their 
organizations. The degree of female-friendliness varies across industries, which can be explained 
by specific industry characteristics, such as customer base and nature of business. Some 
industries, such as consumer, media, entertainment, and information industries, are more female-
friendly. Firms in these industries tend to have more women in the upper echelons for several 
reasons. Firms whose majority customers are women have more women in the upper echelons 
(Bilimoria, 1995; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999: 94; Natividad, 2005; Sweetman, 1996:13) for 
practical and symbolic reasons. Female executives, compared to their male counterparts, have 
deeper understanding and insight on female customers’ nature and needs, so they can better link 
their organizations to their customers, which often leads to better firm performance (Hillman, 
Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999). Also, firms whose workforce 
gender composition does not reflect their customer gender composition may face external 
pressure from various stakeholders, such as shareholders, customers, and the media, to hire more 
women in their organizations. Since the gender composition of top management is more visible 
to public, compared to that of rank-and-file employees, firms having a significant proportion of 
female customers may try to hire and maintain a certain level of women in the upper echelons to 
avoid such pressure and attention. Second, firms in female-friendly industries are likely to appear 
more attractive to women than to men in external labor markets. Third, a large pool of female 
executives (at the industry level) in female-friendly industries helps firms in those industries 
recruit capable and qualified women in high-level positions more easily than firms in male-
dominated industries. 
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Whatever the reason is, firms in female-friendly industries likely have more women in 
the upper echelons, and those women may contribute to creating and maintaining a more female-
friendly culture. In these firms, masculine stereotypes may less prevail and have less impact on 
hiring, promoting, and development decisions. Instead, women in the upper echelons should be 
able to enjoy greater influence in firm-level decisions compared to firms in more male-
dominated industries. In contrast, many U.S. industries are dominated by male (i.e., energy, 
infrastructure), and the male predominance tends to be more intense in the upper echelons of 
firms in those industries. In these firms, men, a majority group, often set the tone for 
organizational norms, and thus masculine stereotypes have a significant influence on various 
decisions including promotion and development opportunities. Accordingly, women are less 
likely to hold top executive positions. Even if they achieve the prestigious positions, they are 
highly likely to face an unfavorable environment. Based on these arguments, I predict that the 
proportion of females who are top five executives in the industry which the firm belongs to 
positively moderates the relationship between female board representation and the likelihood of 
appointing a female CEO. 
Hypothesis 4b. The proportion of female directors is more positively related to the 
likelihood that a firm will appoint a female CEO when the proportion of females who are 
top five executives in the industry which the firm is located is higher. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 SAMPLE 
The primary data for CEO succession comes from Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
ExecuComp database from 1998 to 2012. The initial sample included S&P 1500 firms (18,110 
firm-years). After 80 firms that lack longitudinal continuation are excluded, the sample reduced 
to 1,420 firms (17,085 firm-years). Since this study tests the effects of female board 
representation on CEO succession, the analysis is based on the firms that experienced at least one 
succession event between 1998 and 2012. There were 1,798 succession cases (10.52% of 17,085 
firm-years) of 669 firms. About 27 percent of ExecuComp data was dropped when it was merged 
with RiskMetrics board data, leaving 12,472 firm-years and 1,273 succession cases (10.21% of 
12,472 firm-years). Because of missing values on some variables and the one-year lag structure, 
the final sample includes 1,096 succession cases of 691 firms. Female CEO succession 
constitutes 67 cases, which is 6.11 percent of 1,096 succession cases.  
Information about boards of directors comes from the RiskMetrics Directors Database, 
and any missing values are supplemented by information collected from the manual coding of 
proxy statements filed at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Data on firm 
performance, firm size, and industry characteristics come from ExecuComp. 
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3.2 VARIABLES 
The dependent variable is the gender of the CEO successor, which is coded as a binary 
variable with a value equal to 1 for female CEOs and 0 for male CEOs. The main independent 
variable is the proportion of female directors on the board a year before CEO succession. Also, 
to test the hypotheses about the effect of the critical mass on the CEO successor’s gender, I 
created three dummy variables: one female director, two female directors, and three or more 
female directors. Each variable was coded as 1 if the number of female directors is one, two, and 
three or more female directors, respectively, otherwise 0.  The board interlock ties with firms 
having women in the upper echelons were coded as 1 if there is any woman who holds a position 
of CEO, top-five executive manager, or director in the firm where a director holds a board seat, 
otherwise 0. This variable was created separately for male and female directors. To refine the 
analyses, I also used three other variables: board interlock ties with firms having a female CEO 
only, board interlock ties with firms having female non-CEO executives, and board interlock ties 
with firms having female directors. The results are substantively similar. Female-friendless of 
firms and industries are measured by the proportion of women in top five executive positions at 
the focal firm excluding the CEO and the proportion of females who are top five executives in the 
industry which the firm is located, respectively. The latter was calculated as the average 
proportion of female executives within the top-five executive team of firms in an industry using 
2-digit SIC. 
To control for other factors that may influence female CEO appointment, the following 
control variables were included in each equation. I controlled for four variables related to the 
degree to which female directors exert influence on a group decision. First, female and male 
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directors’ relative board tenure, which is measured as the average tenure of female directors 
relative to that of male directors, was controlled for under the assumption that long-tenured 
female directors are likely to enjoy more power and confidence, and thus be more active in 
sharing their view with male directors. Several studies have argued that tenure as CEO or 
director is positively correlated with the degree of power because long tenure generally means 
better insight and understanding of the firm's culture, resources, and operation, which confers 
expert power on them (Finkelstein, 1992; Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; Singh & Harianto, 
1989; Zald, 1969).  
Second, I also controlled for female and male directors’ relative number of external 
directorship, which is measured as the average number of external directorships held by female 
directors relative to that of male directors. Board memberships often signal the respect and 
recognition that each director receives from the general corporate community (Davis, 1991; 
Mizruchi, 1996). Therefore, holding seats in the boards of multiple companies can act as a proxy 
of the female members’ capability and reputation which are closely related to their power and 
influence on boards.  
Third, the number of women on board committees is measured as the number of female 
directors served on the focal board’s major committees (i.e., the compensation, audit, 
nomination, and corporate governance committee) as a member or a chair. Corporate governance 
literature suggests that members and chairs of major board committees—the corporate 
governance, nomination, compensation, and audit committees—tend to be perceived as holding 
prestigious positions and having prestige power (Finkelstein, 1992).  A number of studies have 
shown that appointments as major board committee members and chairs allow directors to have 
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greater influence on major board decisions than other directors (i.e., Conyon & Peck, 1998; 
Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Dalton, 1998). Also, there is considerable evidence that members or 
chairs of major board committees tend to exert more power both by offering professional advice 
and counsel to the CEO compared to other directors (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Engel, Hayes, 
& Wang, 2010; Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2011; Lorsch & Maclver, 1989). Thus, if a female 
director serves as a member or chair of a major board committee, that position may provide 
prestige power that will help her exert greater influence in the CEO succession process.  
Lastly, female and male directors’ relative ownership is measured by a firm’s shares 
owned by a female director relative to that of male directors. Corporate governance scholars 
view stock ownership as an important source of upper echelon power (Bigley & Wiersema, 
2002; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 
1995). In the principal-agent relationship, stock ownership means “a right to a certain 
proportionate share of voting power on various issues” (Zald, 1969: 100). Voting rights provide 
additional power to directors holding stock ownership and this power increases with the 
proportion of a firm’s shares owned by an executive (Zald, 1969; Finkelstein, 1992; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995). Accordingly, an executive with significant ownership in an organization will be 
perceived to be more powerful compared to an executive without it (Zald, 1969).  
I also included the duration of male and female directors’ overlapping tenure as a factor 
that mitigates negative gender stereotypes about women which likely empower female directors 
to exert greater influence on board decisions. The variable was calculated as the average shared 
tenure (in years) between male and female directors per board in a given year. Research in 
sociology (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980) and social 
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psychology (Byrne, 1971; Byrne & Wong, 1962; Newcomb, 1961) suggests that people tend to 
categorize others as in- and out-group members based on salient and observable characteristics 
which often accompany stereotypes, but continued social interactions over time may alter the 
initial perceptions.  For example, Harrison, Price, and Bell (1998) argue the length of time group 
members work together attenuate the effects of surface-level diversity (e.g., gender, race) and 
intensifies the effects of deep-level diversity (e.g., knowledge, skills, attitudes, beliefs), which 
reduce prejudice and conflicts that may come from stereotypes and enhances group cohesiveness 
that could arise from attitudinal, belief, and value similarity.  Other scholars argue that 
individuals spending time or working together for a sustained period will develop mutual 
acceptance (Kilduff, Crossland, Tsai, & Krackhardt, 2008). Applying this logic to the board-
CEO succession framework, gender difference on a board might initially cause conflicts between 
female directors and male directors. However, as members of the same board engage in more 
interactions over time, stereotypes prompted by gender can be replaced by more accurate 
knowledge of each other as individuals; this generally leads to reduced prejudice and conflict as 
well as greater group cohesiveness (Amir, 1976).  
To mitigate the issue of potential endogeneity, I controlled for two variables than can 
affect both the nomination of female directors and appointment of a female CEO: the gender of 
the nomination committee chair and the gender of the predecessor CEO. Both variables were 
coded as 1 if the chair or predecessor CEO was female, 0 otherwise. 
Three variables measuring board characteristics are included in all models. The average 
age of directors per board is controlled for under the assumption that younger directors are more 
aware of gender equality and thus tend to favor female CEOs more than older directors. Board 
  31 
size is measured as the number of total directors on each board. Board average tenure is 
measured as the average tenure of directors per board. 
Also, two variables measuring board independence are included in all models. While 
boards of directors are known to be officially responsible for selecting a new CEO, previous 
literature shows that predecessor CEOs may also exercise significant influence over the board’s 
selection of the new CEO (Shen & Cannella, 2002). Zajac and Westphal (1996), for example, 
examined how relative CEO/board power can predict whose preferences are realized and found 
that more powerful boards are more likely to change CEO characteristics in the direction of their 
own demographic profile. Because my hypotheses are more likely to be supported when boards 
are independent and more powerful than the predecessor CEOs, I use the following variables to 
control for board independence. The first measure is the proportion of outside directors who are 
not a current or former employee of the company, who do not provide any professional services 
to the company, and who are not a major customer, a recipient of charitable funds, and 
interlocking director, or a family member of a director or executive of the company. The second 
measure is the CEO/chair duality, which is a binary variable coded 1 if a CEO was also the 
board chair and 0 otherwise. In a similar vein, to control for CEO power, I included three CEO-
related variables: CEO age, CEO ownership, and CEO tenure. CEO ownership was multiplied by 
100 to rescale the value for an easier interpretation.  
Other firm-level determinants of the likelihood of appointing a female CEO include firm 
size and performance. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm's total sales. 
Firm performance was measured in both accounting and market terms: ROA and 1-year total 
shareholder returns.  
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3.3 ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES  
Since the dependent variable—the gender of the CEOs—is binary, I use logistic 
regression to predict the likelihood that a firm will appoint a woman into the CEO position. For 
an additional check of robustness, I estimated probit model and complementary log log model. 
As shown in the Appendix Tables A.1-A.3 and B.1-B.3, the results are substantively similar 
across the various techniques. In all models, I lagged the independent variables and control 
variables by one year. Also, all models except Model 3 of Table 4.1 include dummy variables for 
2-digit SIC industries. The coefficient estimates for the industry dummies are not shown in the 
tables. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
4.1 RESULTS 
Table 1.1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients of variables 
used in the analysis. As can be seen from this table, about 18 percent of the sample firms had no 
female directors, and 44 percent, 27 percent, and 11 percent of the sample firms had one, two, 
three or more female directors, respectively. The number of female CEO succession cases, the 
outcome variable, is 67, which is 6.11 percent of 1,096 succession cases. A mean score of 
variance inflation factor (VIF) score is 1.59, with a maximum score of 2.74, a value well below 
the threshold of 10 that signals a potential for a multicollinearity issue (Chatterjee & Price, 
1991).  
Table 2.1 reports the results from logit models predicting the effect of female board 
representation on the likelihood that a woman will be appointed to the CEO position. Model 1 is 
a baseline model with control variables only. To test Hypothesis 1, Model 2 includes the 
proportion of female directors. Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relationship between the 
proportion of female directors and the likelihood that a woman will be appointed to the CEO 
position. As shown in Model 2, the results provide support for the prediction. Model 2 suggests 
that a one-unit increase in the proportion of female directors will produce a 0.08 increase in the 
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probability of appointing female directors, when all of the variables included in the model are 
fixed at their means. Using a Stata command “margins,” I calculated the change in the 
probability of appointing a female CEO when the proportion of female directors increases from 
the mean to one standard deviation greater than the mean. The result shows that the probability 
of appointing a female CEO increases by 0.01 when the proportion of female directors increases 
from the mean (0.13) to one standard deviation above (0.13+0.09=0.22). I also calculated the 
change in the probability of appointing a female CEO when the proportion of female directors 
increases from the mean (0.13) to 0.3. The result shows that the probability of appointing a 
female CEO increases by 0.02 when the proportion of female directors increases from 0.13 to 
0.3. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the positive effect of female board representation on the 
likelihood of appointing a female CEO is realized only when the number of female directors 
reaches a certain threshold. Model 3 of Table 2.1 shows that the coefficient of firms with one 
female director and that of two female directors are statistically not significant. The coefficient 
of three or more female directors, however, is positive and significant. The predicted probability 
of selecting a female CEO depending on the number of female directors per board from Model 3 
is described in Figure 1.1. As the graph shows, the probability of appointing a female director 
increases by about 0.02 when the number of female directors increases from two to three or 
more. The findings show that the magic number that empowers female directors is three. More 
discussion about the critical mass of three will be provided in the conclusions and discussion 
section. 
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Table 3.1 reports the results from logit models predicting the interaction effect between 
board interlock ties with other firms having women in the upper echelons and the proportion of 
female directors on the likelihood that a woman will be appointed to the CEO position. 
Hypothesis 3a predicts that male directors’ board interlocks with other firms having women in 
the upper echelons (the position of CEO, executive, and director) will positively moderate the 
relationship between the proportion of female directors and the likelihood that a firm will appoint 
a female CEO. Model 1 is a baseline model without the interaction terms. As shown in Model 2 
of Table 3.1, the moderating effect of having board interlock ties with firms having woman in a 
position of CEO, top-five executive manager, or director is significant. Thus, Hypothesis 3a 
receives empirical support.  
Since logit model is not linear in the probability metric, I calculated the marginal effects 
at different levels of the proportion of female directors. Specifically, I estimated the probabilities 
of appointing a female CEO when the proportion of female directors is 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3. 
Considering the average board size is about 10, these proportions are about 1, 2, and 3 female 
directors. Using a Stata command “margins,” I estimated the effect of the proportion of female 
directors on the probability of appointing a female CEO when male directors have board 
interlock ties with other firms having women at the top and when they do not have such ties, at 
the three points of the proportion of female directors, which are 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3. In Figure 2.1, 
the solid line shows the marginal effects of the proportion of female directors on the probability 
of appointing a female CEO when there is the effect of board interlocks. As the graph shows, the 
marginal effects increase from 0.013 to 0.024 to 0.045 when the proportion of female directors is 
0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, respectively. All three of the coefficients are significant. The dotted line shows 
the marginal effects of the proportion of female directors on the probability of appointing a 
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female CEO when there is no board interlock effect. As shown in the figure, the marginal effects 
decrease from 0.006 to 0.001 to 0.000 when the proportion of female directors is 0.1, 0.2, and 
0.3, respectively, and none of the coefficients are significant.   
Figure 2.2 shows the probability difference between the two groups. Overall, the 
differences increase from 0.007 to 0.023 to 0.045 when the proportion of female directors is 0.1, 
0.2, and 0.3, respectively. While the first coefficient is not significant, the latter two are 
significant at p=0.05 level. These results imply that the effect of female board representation on 
the likelihood of appointing a female CEO is stronger when directors have an opportunity to 
observe or work with women in the upper echelons of other firms through board interlock ties, 
compared to when they do not have such an opportunity, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3a. 
Furthermore, the results show that even the moderating effect of board interlock ties, as a way of 
mitigating negative gender stereotypes, becomes effective only when there is a certain proportion 
of female directors, which is 0.2. 
I also separated this moderating variable by position—board interlocks with other firms 
having women in the CEO position (“network2”), board interlocks with other firms having 
women in non-CEO executive positions (“network3”), and board interlocks with other firms 
having women in director positions (“network4)—and included each in Model 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively. The results are substantially similar: all of the three variables positively moderate 
the relationship between the proportion of female directors and the likelihood that a firm will 
appoint a female CEO. Interestingly, as shown in Model 3, the moderating effect is strongest 
when the variable is about women whom directors interact with through board interlock ties are 
in the CEO position, compared to the variable about the executive position or director positions. 
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The results imply that directors may realize the value of gender diversity more when the women 
they work with or observe through board interlock ties are in higher positions.  
Hypothesis 3b predicts that female directors’ board interlocks with other firms having 
women in the upper echelons (the position of CEO, executive, and director) will positively 
moderate the relationship between the proportion of female directors and the likelihood that a 
firm will appoint a female CEO. Hypothesis 3b did not receive empirical support, as shown in 
Table 4.1. Although the coefficients of the interaction terms are positive, none of them is 
statistically significant. The insignificant results may be at least partially attributed to two factors 
that may decrease statistical power: first, the proportion of female director is significantly low, 
compared to male directors. Also, female directors have less external board seats compared to 
those of male directors, which means less opportunities to work or observe women in the upper 
echelons of other firms through interlock ties.  
Table 5.1 reports the results from logit models predicting the interaction effect between 
female-friendliness-related measures (the proportion of female executives at the firm level and 
the proportion of women who are top five executives in the industry where the firm is located) 
and the proportion of female directors on the likelihood that a woman will be appointed to the 
CEO position. Model 1 is a baseline model with control variables only. Hypothesis 4a predicts 
that the proportion of female executives positively moderate the relationship between the 
proportion of female directors and the likelihood that a firm will appoint a female CEO. As 
Model 2 shows, the coefficient of the interaction term of the proportion of female executives and 
the proportion of female directors is positive and significant, supporting Hypothesis 4a.  
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Using a Stata command “margins,” I estimated the effect of the proportion of female 
directors on the probability of appointing a female CEO when firms have one or more female 
executives and when they have none, at the three points of the proportion of female directors, 
which are 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3. In Figure 3.1, the solid line shows the marginal effects of the 
proportion of female directors on the probability of appointing a female CEO when firms have 
one or more female executives. As the graph shows, the marginal effects increase from 0.092 to 
0.172 to 0.299 when the proportion of female directors is 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, respectively. All of 
the coefficients are significant. The dotted line shows the marginal effects of the proportion of 
female directors on the probability of appointing a female CEO when there is no female 
executive, and the marginal effects decrease from 0.006 to 0.005 to 0.004 when the proportion of 
female directors is 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3. Figure 3.2 shows the probability difference between the two 
groups. The differences increases from 0.086 to 0.167 to 0.295 when the proportion of female 
directors is 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, respectively, and all of the coefficients are significant. Overall, the 
results imply that the effect of female board representation on the likelihood of appointing a 
female CEO is stronger when there are one or more female executives compared to when there is 
none, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4a.  
Lastly, Hypothesis 4b predicts that the proportion of women who are top five executives 
in the industry in which the firm is located positively moderates the relationship between the 
proportion of female directors and the likelihood that the firm will appoint a female CEO. As 
shown in Model 3 of Table 5.1, Hypothesis 4b also receives support. Using a Stata command 
“margins,” I estimated the effect of the proportion of female directors on the probability of 
appointing a female CEO when the proportion of women who are top five executives in the 
industry which the firm is located is above the median (0.06) and when the proportion is below 
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the median, at the three points of the proportion of female directors, which are 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3. 
In Figure 4.1, the solid line describes the marginal effects of the proportion of female directors 
on the probability of appointing a female CEO when the proportion of women who are top five 
executives in the industry which the firm is located is above the median. As shown in the graph, 
the marginal effects increase from 0.012 to 0.025 to 0.054 when the proportion of female 
directors is 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, respectively. All three of the coefficients are significant. The dotted 
line shows the marginal effects of the proportion of female directors on the probability of 
appointing a female CEO when the proportion of women who are top five executives in the 
industry which the firm is located is below the median. The marginal effects also increase from 
0.018 to 0.021 when the proportion of female directors increases from 0.1 to 0.3, but the slope is 
much flatter than that of solid line. The results imply that the effect of female board 
representation on the likelihood of appointing a female CEO is stronger when the proportion of 
women who are top five executives in the industry which the firm is located is above the median, 
compared to when the proportion is below the median, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4b. 
Figure 4.2 shows the probability difference between the two groups. In this graph, while none of 
them are statistically significant, the marginal effects increase from -0.007 to 0.033 when the 
proportion of female directors increases from 0.1 to 0.3.  
 Because three has been identified in this study as the critical mass that helps female 
directors become more influential on boards, I also ran logit models predicting the interaction 
effect between the moderating variables for Hypotheses 3 and 4 and the indicator variable of 
three or more female directors (1 if three or more female directors, 0 if less than three female 
directors) on the likelihood that a woman will be appointed to the CEO position. The results are 
shown in Table 6.1. When I replace the proportion of female directors with the indicator variable 
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of three or more female directors, most interaction effects, which were positive and significant in 
previous analyses (Table 2.1-4.1), disappear except the one predicted in Hypothesis 4a, which is 
the interaction between the proportion of female directors and that of female executives. One 
possible explanation is the low proportion of firm-years with three or more female directors 
(about 11 percent) which may weaken statistical power.  
 
4.2 ENDOGENEITY  
The core argument of this dissertation is that female board representation is positively 
associated with the likelihood of appointing a female CEO. However, there is a possibility that 
various unobservable factors may make the relationship between female board representation 
and female CEO appointment less causal and more spurious. One may argue that firms that are 
open to having more female directors may also be more open to female CEOs. Also, a recent 
increase in external pressures to appoint women in top management can be another omitted 
variable that may increase both the number of female directors on boards and the likelihood that 
a firm will appoint a female CEO. Lastly, the nature of the work, corporate culture, and industry 
characteristics could be factors that play a significant role in attracting both female directors and 
female CEOs (Matsa & Miller, 2011). The endogeneity issue is not only limited to the main 
effect of female directors but also applies to the interaction effects. For the effect of having board 
interlock ties with firms having women at the top, firms that share directors through board 
interlock ties may also share other traits such as female-friendliness in the first place even before 
directors diffuse what they learn or observe trough the networks. For the moderating effect of the 
proportion of female executives in the firm, firms that are open to having more female executives 
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may also be more open to appointing a woman to the CEO position. For the moderating effect of 
the proportion of women who are top five executives in the industry where the firm operates, a 
large pool of female executives in female-friendly industries can be another factor that increases 
the odds of minorities being appointed to the CEO position because more female executives in 
an industry can mean more potential female CEO candidates in the industry. 
I attempted to address this endogeneity issue by controlling for four potential omitted 
variables which may affect both female board representation and female CEO appointment: the 
proportion of female executives, the proportion of females who are top five executives in the 
industry which the firm is located, the gender of the nomination committee chair, and the gender 
of the predecessor CEO. First, the proportion of female executives is used as a proxy for the 
organization’s unobserved cultural and institutional characteristics, such as female-friendliness 
or a gender egalitarian culture (Shin, 2012), which may affect both female board representation 
and the likelihood that women will be appointed as the CEO. Second, I also controlled for the 
proportion of females who are top five executives in the industry which the firm is located. Firms 
often hire a new director or a new CEO among top executives of other firms in the same 
industry. Thus, a high proportion of women in top executive positions in a certain industry may 
have a positive effect on both the proportion of female directors and the likelihood of appointing 
a female CEO in firms in the industry.  Lastly, I controlled for having a female chair of the 
nomination committee and the gender of the past CEO because both positions have a substantial 
influence in both director nomination and CEO appointment. If the nomination committee chair 
is a woman, she is likely to support women in both director nomination and CEO appointment 
decisions. Similarly, if the past CEO is woman, she is likely to have a positive effect on both 
female board representation and the likelihood of appointment a female CEO.  
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 To further mitigate the endogeneity issue, I included year fixed-effects and industry 
fixed-effects for the following reasons. Year fixed-effects reduce the possibility of reverse 
causality and control for unobserved heterogeneities such as macro-economic shocks, media 
coverage, and policy debates on female representation that may affect all firms in the same year. 
Also, industry fixed-effects control for the time-invariant unobservable industry characteristics 
that may be correlated with the number of female board members and the appointment of a 
female CEO. After controlling for the control variables and the year and industry dummies, the 
coefficients for the three or more female directors and other interaction terms were still positive 
and significant. I believe this approach at least partially contributes to addressing the issue of 
endogeneity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, I examined how female board representation affects the likelihood that 
firms will appoint a female CEO. The theoretically established relationship between the board of 
directors and CEO appointment provides an excellent empirical setting to examine the 
relationship between female board representation and female CEO appointment. Also, in-group 
favoritism, the central tenet of social identity theory, provides a solid theoretical explanation for 
female directors’ preference for a female CEO candidate. This dissertation supplements social 
identity theory with critical mass theory and argues that the positive effect of female board 
representation can be maximized when the number of female directors reaches a certain 
threshold, namely a critical mass. While critical mass theory suggests that the group size can 
change the nature of group interactions, it does not identify a specific number (Torchia et al., 
2011). Using a sample of large U.S. firms, my study provides an empirical evidence that the 
critical mass may be three. This finding is consistent with previous arguments based on some 
theories, experiments, and surveys.   
Justifying a critical mass of three can start from evidence demonstrating that both one and 
two minority members are pigeonholed as tokens. Research on group diversity and small group 
dynamics argue that not only one individual but also two individuals of a minority group are 
treated as tokens in groups. Kanter (1977a) argues that “if the absolute size of the skewed group 
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is small, tokens can also be solos, the only one of their kind present; but even if there are two 
tokens in a skewed group, it is difficult for them to generate an alliance that can become 
powerful in the group” (Kanter, 1977a: 382). Loyd, White, Kern, and Phillps (2008) provide a 
theoretical explanation on why not only a minority solo but also a minority duo still are tokens 
and cannot be a critical mass. Drawing on theories in token status (Kanter, 1977a) and small 
group dynamics (e.g., Phillips & Loyd, 2006), the authors argue that duo status may be even 
more stressful and isolating than solo status for minorities because members of a minority duo 
not only face negative inter-group (between a majority and minority group) pressure from 
members of a majority group, but also experience in-group (within a minority group) pressure to 
provide social support to one another. A minority group faces greater inter-group pressure from a 
majority group when its group size is smaller. This is because numerical inferiority, in 
combination with their minority status, further undermines the minority group members’ position 
relative to that of the majority group members. Also, a minority group faces greater in-group 
pressure to support each other when its group size is smaller. This is because as the number of 
members of a minority group decreases, the amount of support required to each member 
increases, which causes more pressure to them (for reviews see Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002; 
Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Since two is the smallest number of individuals for a group, it is 
possible to assume that the total amount of pressure on minority members peaks when the 
number of members of a minority group is exactly two, but the pressure begins to decrease after 
that point. In other words, minority members’ influence in a group is likely to increase when 
their number exceeds two.  
Empirical evidence supports the value of increasing the number of minorities from two to 
three. Research on influence and conformity in groups views three as a “magic number” in group 
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dynamic. Asch’s conformity experiments (Asch, 1951) demonstrated that three people exert 
substantial influence in changing group dynamics, as compared to two people (for a more 
detailed explanation of the Asch’s studies, see Konrad et al., 2008). This finding is mirrored in 
reality. In the interviews of women directors in Fortune 1000 firms conducted by Konrad and her 
colleagues (2008), one woman director said, “If you’re the only woman, you can be dismissed 
with, ‘That person is here just so we can say there’s a woman on the board.’” (p.148). Also, 
another woman director described a board where she is the only woman as “a group that views 
her as a different person than they are, is not collegial, does not have a lot of conversation or 
interaction between male directors and herself.” (p.150) They show that when there are two 
female directors, the situation often changes more favorably for women, compared to when there 
is only one female director, but tokenism is highly likely to remain in the group. In this case, 
although the female directors may feel more included and comfortable, they still may not act 
collectively in order to avoid being seen as conspirators (Konrad et al., 2008). When the number 
increases to three or more, however, female directors said that they became more vocal, 
assertive, and relaxed.  The authors emphasize the value of moving beyond two, arguing that 
three or more women in the boardroom make a definite shift in the quality of women’s 
experiences (p.154). According to the authors, three female directors are beneficial for creating 
change, such as breaking the stereotypes about women or shifting an “all-male communication 
dynamic.” (p.146)   
These theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from the experiments and survey 
provide support to the findings of my study. The findings of my study is somewhat consistent to 
Kanter’s (1977a) argument. She argues that minorities who constitute less than 15 percent of a 
group are “tokens”, but if the percentage of minorities reaches 35 percent, they become potential 
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allies with each other, form coalitions, and affect the general culture of the group. The mean 
board size of the sample used in this dissertation is about 10.09. Thus, the arguments about the 
absolute numbers of female directors—one, two, and three—also roughly corresponds with 
Kanter’s 15 percent and 35 percent argument. However, regardless of the board size, the critical 
mass of three as an absolute number would still be significant because of the power it confers to 
the minority members.   
Furthermore, this dissertation shows how various factors strengthen the effect of female 
board representation on the likelihood that a firm will appoint a female CEO. By analyzing 1,096 
succession cases of U.S. firms, I demonstrated that a firm is more likely to appoint a female CEO 
when the board has three or more female directors. This supports my argument that the critical 
mass enables female directors to voice and become more influential in group decisions and it 
will be shown as the increased likelihood of appointing a female CEO. The results also show that 
the effect of female board representation on the likelihood that a firm will appoint a female CEO 
is stronger under two conditions: (1) when directors have an opportunity to observe or work with 
women in the upper echelons of other firms through board interlock ties, which likely mitigate 
negative gender stereotypes, and (2) when the organization or upper echelon culture is more 
female-friendly.  
This study makes several important contributions to research on upper echelon groups, 
CEO succession, and the board of directors. First, this study extends the literature on the upper 
echelons by demonstrating any consideration of diversity in upper echelon groups should also 
include an examination of inequality. Previous studies have argued that gender diversity on 
boards or that of top management teams have positive effects on firm outcomes such as firm 
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performance, firm strategy, or firm innovation. These arguments, however, overlook an 
important fact that women are a demographic and numeric minority, and their minority status 
may prevent them from contributing to group decisions and firm outcomes. The present study 
considers female directors’ minority status and demonstrates that the positive effect of female 
board representation is realized only when there are three or more women on boards. 
Furthermore, I showed that the positive effect of female board representation on the likelihood of 
women being appointed to the CEO position is stronger when negative gender stereotypes are 
mitigated and positive value of gender diversity is emphasized. The results demonstrate that 
having more board interlock ties with other firms having women at the top and having more 
female executives within organizations or industries positively moderate the relationship 
between female board representation and female CEO appointment. Although this study 
specifically focuses on women, the implication could also be expanded to other types of 
minorities, such as racial and ethnic minorities. Future studies examining positive effects of 
demographically diverse groups, therefore, should note that advantages of diversity can be 
maximized when demographic minorities are allowed to voice and affect group decisions.  
Second, this study further extends the literature on the upper echelons by providing an 
answer to the question of whether women in the upper echelons help other women in hiring and 
evaluation decisions. It has been widely believed and proven that people are attracted to people 
who are demographically similar to them and evaluate the similar others more positively and 
favorably in hiring, promotion, and evaluation decisions. While the assumption may be applied 
to various demographic groups in different settings in theory, minorities in prestige work groups 
could be an exception due to certain characteristics of both minorities and prestige work groups. 
More exactly, while women and people of color in prestige work groups may also be affected by 
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in-group favoritism, the combination of numeric and status-related disadvantages are likely to 
constrain their behavior in the groups (Duguid, Loyd, & Tolbert, 2012).  Despite this possibility, 
the assumption of in-group favoritism about minorities, specifically women, in prestige work 
groups has not been tested enough to advance our understanding on this specific relationship. 
The present study contributes to the literature on social identity theory and the upper echelons by 
elucidating the in-group favoritism behavior of minorities on boards of directors. The findings of 
this study show that female directors’ preference for a female CEO candidate, an assumption 
drawing on social identity theory, may be realized under certain organizational conditions: when 
the female directors’ number is big enough to affect the appointment decision or when 
organizational conditions are favorable to them. The findings could also be generalized to 
different types of minorities (i.e, ethnic minorities) in other prestige work groups besides women 
on boards.  
Third, this study contributes to the literature on leadership succession by shedding light 
on a research question that remained underexplored for a long time: under what conditions an 
organization is more likely to appoint a female leader? While there is a large body of literature 
on barriers to mobility for minorities, not much is known about organizational conditions that 
increase the likelihood of minorities being promoted or appointed to leadership positions (Cook 
& Glass, 2013). The present study contributes to closing this gap by studying female board 
representation as an important organizational predictor of female CEO appointment. Compared 
to other organizational factors that accompany various noises which cannot be easily controlled 
for, such as firm performance, female board composition is a better organizational predictor of 
female CEO appointment because of the clear link between the board of directors and CEO 
appointment. Also, social identity theory provides a solid theoretical foundation to female 
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directors’ preference for a female CEO candidate. The findings of this study suggest that female 
board composition can be a good predictor of the likelihood that firms will select a female CEO 
when their numeric and status-related disadvantages are reduced. The findings imply that the odd 
of any type of minorities (i.e., women, people of color) being promoted or appointed to the 
leadership positions may depend on the proportion of that specific type of minorities of a hiring 
group. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that it is important to consider disadvantages 
associated with minorities’ demographic group when examining their effect on organizational 
outcomes. Considering that female directors’ behaviors on boards are constrained by their 
numeric inferiority and relatively low social status, the present study demonstrates that 
overcoming the numeric and status-related disadvantages can help minority climb to the top of 
corporate ladder.  
Lastly, this study contributes to the research on boards of directors, specifically the 
literature on the effect of board diversity. As the value of board gender diversity has gained 
popularity in recent years, many scholars have examined the effect of board gender diversity on 
various firm outcomes, including firm performance, firm innovation, firm strategy, and corporate 
social responsibility. In spite of the importance of studying each organizational outcome, the 
surprisingly mixed findings of these studies make their contribution less significant and less 
meaningful. While the oversight of the effect of inequality provides a theoretical explanation for 
the inconsistency, the use of distal outcomes may be another problem that makes the relationship 
between board gender composition and each outcome less causal and more spurious. 
Organizational outcomes like firm performance, innovation, strategy, and corporate social 
responsibility can be affected by various observable and unobservable factors besides boards and 
board gender composition. Statistically, it is almost impossible to identify and control for every 
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confounding variable that affects the relationship. The failure to account for more confounding 
factors leads to greater omitted variable bias.  The present study attempts to minimize this issue 
by using CEO appointment as an organizational outcome. The direct and clear linkage between 
the board of director and CEO appointment decreases any potential noises that may affect the 
relationship between female board representation and female CEO appointment. Scholars who 
study the effect of board gender diversity should also use more proximal firm outcomes or 
include as many as control variables in order to capture a clearer picture.  
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CHAPTER 6 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Several limitations of this study should be noted. One limitation of this study is the issue 
of potential endogeneity. There is a possibility that various unobservable factors may make the 
relationship between female board representation and female CEO appointment less causal and 
more spurious. As I mentioned in the separate section, this study mitigates the endogeneity issue 
by using an extensive set of control variables. Nonetheless, I am aware that this effort does not 
fully address the issue.  
Second, the effects of female board representation on female CEO appointment were 
inferred instead of being measured through direct observation in this study. Although I used a 
straighforward framework—the board of directors and CEO appointment—and a well 
established and widely accepted theoretical explanation—social identity theory and critical mass 
theory—to explain the underlying mechanism of  the relationship between female directors and a 
female CEO candidate, the findings do not fully represent actual behavior. A survey of directors 
is one way to address this issue, but it involves some barriers such as very low response rates and 
high cost to conduct a repeated longitudinal study with a set panel of respondents 
(Chattopadhyay, Glick, Miller, & Huber, 1999). Using a qualitative approach can be another way 
to address the issue. This approach would provide a richer description of actual boardroom 
dynamics that is usually unavailable in quantitative research (Shin, 2012).  
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This study provides some potential avenues for future research. First, this dissertation 
focuses on gender, primarily due to its popularity in both academia and industry, and its salience 
which facilitates empirical tests. However, diversity can be defined by various factors beyond 
gender and thus future studies should consider examining different aspects of diversity such as 
race and ethnicity. Similar to women, racial and ethnic minorities are rare in the ranks of top 
corporate executives (Cook & Glass, 2013). Although women and ethnic minorities are both 
numeric minorities, the underlying mechanisms that shape the probability of the racial and ethnic 
minorities being appointed to leadership positions may be different from those for women, due to 
different characteristics and career paths of women and the other types of minorities. Thus, 
examining dimensions of diversity other than gender will be a meaningful addition to this stream 
of research. 
Future studies can also capture a clearer picture of the effect of female directors on firm 
outcomes by controlling for additional variables. First, the type of CEO succession—whether it 
is inside or outside—has different impacts on power dynamics within the top management team 
and boards. Inside CEO successors often have the approval of directors—both inside and 
outside—and also have support within the top management team while outside CEO successor 
tend to struggle due to the lack of internal social networks and coalitions (Shen & Cannella, 
2002; Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Dalton & Kesner, 1985). The type of CEO successor may 
affect the probability of women being appointed to the CEO position such that inside succession 
may be positively associated with female CEO appointment while outside succession could be 
negatively associated with the same outcome.  Thus, it is important to control for the type of 
CEO succession, whether the successor was promoted from within in the organization or hired 
from outside. In a similar vein, it is important to control if a female CEO successor was a board 
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member prior to the appointment as CEO because such experience is also likely to increase the 
probability of being appointed to the CEO position. Also, given that the board chair often has a 
significant influence over board decisions, I propose that future studies control for the gender of 
the board chair.  
To further mitigate the issue of endogeneity, I suggest that future research control for 
more variables that are related to female friendliness in addition to what I included in the present 
study. The proportion of female managers at the industry level not only represents female-
friendliness of the industry but is also related to availability of female job candidate in the labor 
market. Thus, it is important to control for this variable, which can be obtained from Census 
data, to capture a clearer picture. Gender composition of consumers is another important variable 
that implies female-friendliness of the firm and the industry. 
 Another avenue for future research is to examine the effect of ownership structure. 
Corporate governance scholars have argued firm outcomes such as CEO pay (Shin & Seo, 2011) 
or strategic actions (Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010) can be affected by whether firms’ 
largest investors have business relationships with their portfolio firms or not (pressure-sensitive 
or pressure-resistant institutional investors: Brickly, Lease, & Smith, 1988; Bushee, Carter, & 
Gerako, 2014) or whether the largest investors acquire concentrated equity positions and have 
extended investment horizons or acquire less concentrated equity stakes and have a shorter 
investment horizon (dedicated or transient institutional investors: Bushee, 2004; Porter, 1992). 
CEO succession is another outcome that may be affected by the type of institutional investors. 
For example, one can assume that transient institutional investors may prefer a male CEO 
candidate to a female CEO candidate because the transient investors’ primary interest is in 
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earning more profit in a shorter period of time rather than in gender equality or value of gender 
diversity, which is more remotely and unclearly related to immediate profit realization.  Given its 
potential impact on CEO appointment, thus, future studies should take the type of institutional 
ownership into consideration. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study shows that the boardroom may hold the key to increasing the likelihood the 
firms will appoint a female CEO. Given that boards of directors play essential roles in CEO 
appointment, and female directors are highly likely to support a female CEO candidate, the 
presence of more women on corporate boards could be a solution for the underrepresentation of 
women in leadership positions. Therefore, firms interested in hiring a female CEO should 
monitor gender composition of boards to ensure enough female representation. This study also 
demonstrates that the positive effect of female board representation on appointing a woman into 
the CEO position can be stronger by mitigating negative gender stereotypes and increasing 
female-friendliness.  
The findings of this study also provide a solution for the dearth of women in the upper 
echelons. Although some studies show the negative effect of the appointment of female CEOs 
(i.e., Lee & James, 1997), hiring a female CEO can be one of the most effective ways to boost 
female representation in high-level positions. The paucity of women in high-level positions has 
drawn substantial attention from the media and academia in recent years, resulting in calls for 
firms to actively increase their representation at the top of organizations. Firms have answered 
these calls with various efforts, such as mentoring system, diversity training programs, and 
urging women to “lean in,” but the fact that women still remain underrepresented in the upper 
echelons makes clear that such efforts have been insufficient. This is because these efforts 
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mostly focus on changing individual perceptions of gender stereotypes or advancing an 
understanding of the value of gender diversity, which is often hard to achieve and requires long 
periods of time to fulfill the full effect. Also, exhorting women to “lean in” may actually backfire 
as such behaviors, often male-typed, may be viewed as threating to the status-quo and lead to 
negative evaluation of women (Fiske, Bersoff, Bordiga, Deaux, & Heilman, 1991; Rudman, 
Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). 
Wolf and Fligstein argue that “the behaviors and policies of employers are much more 
important causes of sexual differences in authority in the workplace than are the attitudes and 
behaviors of the women themselves (1979: 235),” and it appears to remain the same over the last 
30 years. To truly address the need for more equitable representation in the upper echelons, firms 
must make more structural changes that allow women to overcome the historical stereotypes 
currently preventing them from climbing the corporate ladder. Increasing the number of female 
CEOs can be the most efficient way to achieve it because female CEOs can contribute to 
enhance female representation in the upper echelons by supporting women in various ways 
including being mentors and role models, and supporting them in hiring and promotion 
decisions. As my study shows, all of these positive changes can start from increasing the number 
of female directors and promoting the value of gender diversity. The Chief Operating Officer 
(COO) of Facebook, Sheryl Sandberg said in her recent book Lean In that women in 
organizations should lean in—her metaphor for speaking up—to achieve their full potential. To 
make their efforts more effective and efficient, however, it is also time for firms to ‘lean in’ too. 
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Table 2.1. Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female 
CEO  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Log of total firm sales -.13 -.11 -.11
                                (.14) (.14) (.14)
Return on assets -.02 * -.02 * -.02 *
                                (.01) (.01) (.01)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .36 .39 .36
                                (.31) (.32) (.32)
CEO-chair duality .93 * .84 * .88 *
                                (.40) (.40) (.40)
CEO age -.01 -.01 -.01
                                (.03) (.03) (.03)
CEO ownership -.78 -1.04 -.89
                                (.86) (.92) (.90)
CEO tenure -.01 .00 .00
                                (.03) (.03) (.03)
Proportion of independent directors -2.13 -1.96 -2.09
                                (1.52) (1.54) (1.52)
Board size -.12 -.08 -.16
                                (.11) (.10) (.10)
Directors' average age .00 .03 .02
                                (.06) (.06) (.06)
Board average tenure .05 .04 .05
                                (.06) (.06) (.06)
Gender of nomination committee chair -1.11 -1.18 -1.20
  (1=female, 0=male) (.79) (.81) (.81)
Gender of the predecessor CEO -.25 -.67 -.63
  (1=female, 0=male) (.74) (.76) (.78)
Number of women on major board committees  -.14 -.38 -.30
                                (.41) (.43) (.43)
Female-male directors' relative board tenure .20 .33 .04
                                (.82) (.81) (.53)
Female-male directors' relative # of external directorship .27 .25 .30
                                (.21) (.21) (.21)
Female-male directors' relative director ownership -.04 -.07 * -.06 *
                                (.03) (.03) (.03)
Proportion top 5 female executives in the industry -10.88 -8.80 -9.04
                                (9.39) (9.62) (9.61)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure .30 -.85 -.62
                                (1.04) (1.14) -(.98)  
  82 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Network to other boards whose firm has female CEO, .48 .27 .47
  executives, and directors at the top (.68) (.69) (.70)
Proportion of female executives 10.11 ** 9.75 ** 9.93 **
                                (1.16) (1.17) (1.20)
Proportion of female directors (H1) 6.06 **
                                (2.23)
(marginal effect) .08 **
(.03)
One female director .39
                                (.61)
(marginal effect) .01
(.01)
Two female directors .36
                                (.73)
(marginal effect) .01
(.01)
Three or more female directors  (H2) 1.71 *
                                (.84)
(marginal effect) .03 *
(.01)
Constant -2.64 -5.59 -4.79
                                (3.95) (3.93) (3.94)
Number of observations 1,096     1,096     1,096     
Log likelihood -164.27 -161.04 -160.82
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and 2-digit industry dummies.
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.1. Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female 
CEO  
Variable
Log of total firm sales -.11 -.12 -.24 -.16 -.10
                                (.14) (.11) (.20) (.14) (.14)
Return on assets -.02 * -.01 -.02 -.02 * -.02 *
                                (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .39 .21 .25 .32 .36
                                (.32) (.23) (.50) (.34) (.33)
CEO-chair duality .84 * .43 * .46 .84 * .74 +
                                (.40) (.21) (.62) (.40) (.40)
CEO age -.01 -.01 .04 -.01 -.01
                                (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03)
CEO ownership -1.04 -.96 -.86 -1.01 -1.08
                                (.92) (.92) (1.79) (.96) (.98)
CEO tenure .00 -.01 -.02 -.01 .01
                                (.03) (.03) (.06) (.03) (.03)
Proportion of independent directors -1.96 -1.21 -4.22 -1.73 -2.05
                                (1.54) (1.47) (2.70) (1.54) (1.57)
Board size -.08 -.05 -.19 -.07 -.10
                                (.10) (.08) (.15) (.10) (.10)
Directors' average age .03 .01 -.05 .01 .03
                                (.06) (.03) (.10) (.06) (.06)
Board average tenure .04 .58 .06 .05 .04
                                (.06) (.06) (.10) (.06) (.06)
Gender of nomination committee chair -1.18 -.88 -.21 -.98 -.98
  (1=female, 0=male) (.81) (.64) (1.43) (.82) (.82)
Gender of the predecessor CEO -.67 .25 -.74 -.56 -.54
  (1=female, 0=male) (.76) (.46) (.82) (.79) (.73)
Number of women on major board -.38 .21 -.64 -.41 -.36
  committees  (.43) (.23) (.66) (.43) (.43)
Female-male directors' relative board .33 .02 -.15 .02 .42
  tenure                         (.81) (.65) (1.57) (.85) (.82)
Female-male directors' relative # of .25 .27 -.04 .28 .22
  external  directorship (.21) (.21) (.47) (.21) (.21)
Female-male directors' relative director -.07 * -.07 * -.07 + -.07 * -.07 *
  ownership (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Proportion top 5 female executives in the -8.80 -7.54 -10.08 -11.64 -7.76
  industry (9.62) (5.32) (16.74) (9.88) (9.93)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure -.85 -.10 2.55 -.10 -1.09
                                (1.14) (.98) (2.22) (1.22) (1.18)
Model 5
Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female CEO
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 
  84 
Variable
Proportion of female executives 9.75 ** 10.01 ** 6.60 ** 9.81 ** 10.16 **
                                (1.17) (1.20) (1.10) (.89) (1.21)
Proportion of female directors 6.06 ** -15.24 -26.58 ** -12.13 10.60
                                (2.23) (11.66) (12.70) (9.74) (6.47)
Network to other boards whose firm has    
female CEO, executives, and directors .27 -1.29
  ("network1"- for male directors) (.69) (.80)
Network to other boards whose firm has 
female CEO 2.20 *
  ("network2"-for male directors)  (.96)
Network to other boards whose firm has   
female executives .00
  ("network3"- for male directors)  (.72)
Network to other boards whose firm has 
female directors .17
  ("network4"-for male directors) (.18)
Network1 (for male directors) 21.08 *
  x Proportion of female directors  (10.70)
(marginal effect)  .37 +
(.18)
Network2 (for male directors) 30.49 *
  x Proportion of female directors  (12.38)
(marginal effect) .03 +
(.02)
Network3 (for male directors) 7.64 +
  x Proportion of female directors (4.51)
(marginal effect) .13 +
(.07)
Network4 (for male directors) 13.13 +
  x Proportion of female directors  (6.90)
(marginal effect) .23 +
(.12)
Constant -5.59 -3.63 -4.06 -3.48 -6.69
                                (3.93) (4.04) (5.31) (3.07) (4.19)
Number of observations 1,096   1,096   1,096   1,096   1,096   
Log likelihood -161.04 -157.47 -102.14 -157.47 -158.27
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and 2-digit industry dummies.
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Table 4.1. Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female 
CEO  
Variable
Log of total firm sales -.11 -.12 -.24 -.16 -.10
                                (.14) (.11) (.20) (.14) (.14)
Return on assets -.02 * -.01 -.02 -.02 * -.02 *
                                (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .39 .21 .25 .32 .36
                                (.32) (.23) (.50) (.34) (.33)
CEO-chair duality .84 * .43 * .46 .84 * .74 +
                                (.40) (.21) (.62) (.40) (.40)
CEO age -.01 -.01 .04 -.01 -.01
                                (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03)
CEO ownership -1.04 -.96 -.86 -1.01 -1.08
                                (.92) (.92) (1.79) (.96) (.98)
CEO tenure .00 -.01 -.02 -.01 .01
                                (.03) (.03) (.06) (.03) (.03)
Proportion of independent directors -1.96 -1.21 -4.22 -1.73 -2.05
                                (1.54) (1.47) (2.70) (1.54) (1.57)
Board size -.08 -.05 -.19 -.07 -.10
                                (.10) (.08) (.15) (.10) (.10)
Directors' average age .03 .01 -.05 .01 .03
                                (.06) (.03) (.10) (.06) (.06)
Board average tenure .04 .58 .06 .05 .04
                                (.06) (.06) (.10) (.06) (.06)
Gender of nomination committee chair -1.18 -.88 -.21 -.98 -.98
  (1=female, 0=male) (.81) (.64) (1.43) (.82) (.82)
Gender of the predecessor CEO -.67 .25 -.74 -.56 -.54
  (1=female, 0=male) (.76) (.46) (.82) (.79) (.73)
Number of women on major board -.38 .21 -.64 -.41 -.36
  committees  (.43) (.23) (.66) (.43) (.43)
Female-male directors' relative board .33 .02 -.15 .02 .42
  tenure                         (.81) (.65) (1.57) (.85) (.82)
Female-male directors' relative # of .25 .27 -.04 .28 .22
  external  directorship (.21) (.21) (.47) (.21) (.21)
Female-male directors' relative director -.07 * -.07 * -.07 + -.07 * -.07 *
  ownership (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Proportion top 5 female executives in the -8.80 -7.54 -10.08 -11.64 -7.76
  industry (9.62) (5.32) (16.74) (9.88) (9.93)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure -.85 -.10 2.55 -.10 -1.09
                                (1.14) (.98) (2.22) (1.22) (1.18)
Model 5
Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female CEO
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Variable
Proportion of female executives 9.75 ** 9.81 ** 6.09 ** 10.01 ** 9.16 **
                                (1.17) (.89) (1.70) (1.20) (.98)
Proportion of female directors 6.06 ** 12.13 -18.67 ** -15.24 11.60
                                (2.23) (9.74) (6.73) (11.66) (9.47)
Network to other boards whose firm 
has female CEO, executives, and -.25
  ("network1"- for female directors) (.21)
Network to other boards whose firm 
has female CEOs .48
  ("network2"-for female directors)  (.37)
Network to other boards whose firm 
has female  executives  -.23
  ("network3"-for female directors) (.19)
Network to other boards whose firm 
has female  directors .87
  ("network4"-for female directors) (.50)
Network1 (for female directors) 4.82
  x Proportion of female directors  (3.21)
(marginal effect)  .07
(.06)
Network2 (for female directors) 6.88
  x Proportion of female directors  (4.98)
(marginal effect) .00
(.00)
Network3 (for female directors) 3.75
  x Proportion of female directors  (3.02)
(marginal effect) .00
(.00)
Network4 (for female directors) 5.14
  x Proportion of female directors  (3.91)
(marginal effect) .04
(.03)
Constant -5.59 -3.22 -3.14 -3.49 -3.78
                                (3.93) (4.59) (4.11) (4.11) (4.69)
Number of observations 1,096 1,096 1,096 1,096 1,096 
Log likelihood
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and 2-digit industry dummies.
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
-127.86-119.52-125.77-123.05-161.04
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Table 5.1. Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female 
CEO  
Variable
Log of total firm sales -.11 -.07 -.12
                                (.14) (.14) (.12)
Return on assets -.02 * -.02 * -.02 *
                                (.01) (.01) (.01)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .39 .33 .41
                                (.32) (.33) (.30)
CEO-chair duality .84 * .82 * .77 *
                                (.40) (.40) (.36)
CEO age -.01 -.01 -.01
                                (.03) (.03) (.03)
CEO ownership -1.04 -1.15 -.96
                                (.92) (.98) (.77)
CEO tenure .00 .00 -.02
                                (.03) (.03) (.03)
Proportion of independent directors -1.96 -1.95 -1.34
                                (1.54) (1.53) (1.33)
Board size -.08 -.10 -.03
                                (.10) (.10) (.08)
Directors' average age .03 .04 .04
                                (.06) (.06) (.05)
Board average tenure .04 .04 .03
                                (.06) (.06) (.06)
Gender of nomination committee chair -1.18 -1.26 -.89
  (1=female, 0=male) (.81) (.83) (.72)
Gender of the predecessor CEO -.67 -.56 -.36
  (1=female, 0=male) (.76) (.77) (.71)
Number of women on major board committees  -.38 -.41 -.42
                                (.43) (.44) (.39)
Female-male directors' relative board tenure .33 .29 .48
                                (.81) (.82) (.74)
Female-male directors' relative # of external .25 .27 .19
  directorship (.21) (.21) (.18)
Female-male directors' relative director -.07 * -.10 * -.08 **
  ownership (.03) (.04) (.03)
Proportion top 5 female executives in the -8.80 -8.27 -7.99
  industry (9.62) (9.67) (6.22)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure -.85 -.77 -1.23
                                (1.14) (1.15) (1.06)
Model 1
Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female CEO
Model 2 Model 3
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Variable
Proportion of female executives 9.75 ** 7.91 ** 9.20 **
                                (1.17) (1.78) (1.01)
Proportion of female directors 6.06 ** 3.20 .46
                                (2.23) (3.15) (3.14)
Network to other boards whose firm has female .27 .34 .54
  CEO, executives, and directors ("network1") (.69) (.68) (.63)
Proportion of female executives 9.06 *
  x Proportion of female directors (H4a) (4.99)
(marginal effect) .13 *
(.07)
Proportion of top 5 female executives in the 7.86 *
  industry x Proportion of female directors (H4b) (3.27)
(marginal effect) .12 +
(.07)
Constant -5.59 -6.08 -6.30 *
                                (3.93) (3.98) (3.17)
Number of observations 1,096         1,096         1,432         
Log likelihood -161.04 -160.13 -177.04
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and Models 1 and 2 include 2-digit
          industry dummies.
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Table 6.1. Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female CEO  
Variable
Proportion of female directors 6.37 **
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2.06)
Log of total firm sales -.14 -.14 -.22 -.45 -.14 -.17 -.12 -.12
                                (.14) (.14) (.14) (.16) (.15) (.16) (.14) (.14)
Return on assets -.02 * -.02 * -.02 + -.01 -.019+ -.02 * -.02 * -.02 *
                                (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .36 .35 .25 .28 .45 .39 .34 .36
                                (.42) (.41) (.43) (.52) (.51) (.51) (.41) (.42)
CEO-chair duality .818* * .86 * .73 + .63 1.03 * 1.03 * .85 * .88 *
                                (.38) (.38) (.39) (.44) (.43) (.42) (.39) (.39)
CEO age -.02 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.02
                                (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
CEO ownership -1.02 -.92 -.83 -.83 -.79 -.71 -.88 -.94
                                (.94) (.92) (.90) (1.33) (.93) (.87) (.89) (.93)
CEO tenure -.01 -.01 -.02 .00 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01
                                (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Proportion of independent directors -1.51 -1.62 -1.54 -1.33 -.63 -.84 -1.69 -1.90
                                (1.51) (1.48) (1.50) (1.87) (1.73) (1.70) (1.50) (1.49)
Board size -.03 -.11 -.15 -.22 -.15 -.18 + -.13 -.12
                                (.09) (.09) (.10) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.10) (.10)
Directors' average age .04 .02 .02 -.01 .01 .01 .04 .04
                                (.06) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.06)
Board average tenure .03 .05 .05 .06 .10 .10 .05 .04
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (.06) (.06) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.06)
Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female CEO
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Variable
Proportion of female executives 6.99 ** 7.06 ** 5.73 ** 6.53 ** 3.99 * 7.51 ** 6.46 ** 7.42 **
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (.87) (.88) (.98) (1.00) (1.73) (.99) (.93) (.93)
Number of women on major board -.33 -.22 -.17 -.28 -.19 -.38 -.25 -.26
  committees  (.42) (.41) (.43) (.49) (.46) (.46) (.43) (.42)
Female-male directors' relative board -.22 -.28 -.80 -1.76 -1.32 -1.13 -.63 -.64
  tenure                         (.83) (.48) (.90) (1.15) (1.00) (.96) (.87) (.87)
Female-male directors' relative # of .24 .32 .28 .39 .39 .38 .34 .35
  external  directorship (.22) (.23) (.23) (.29) (.25) (.24) (.23) (.23)
Female-male directors' relative director .01 .01 -.01 -.01 -.03 .00 .02 .01
  ownership (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Proportion top 5 female executives in the -6.12 -6.21 -5.22 .50 -5.71 -6.29 -5.63 -8.07
  industry (8.48) (8.47) (8.62) (10.55) (9.20) (9.32) (8.42) (8.65)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure -.76 .46 .46 2.07 1.49 1.05 .57 .58
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (1.12) (1.09) (1.09) (1.41) (1.25) (1.22) (1.05) (1.05)
Three or more female directors 1.53 ** .03 1.46 .63 .89 .43 .21
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (.45) (1.31) (.91) (.96) (1.43) (.83) (.98)
Network to other boards whose firm has    
female CEO, executives, and directors .34 .59 .26 * .58 .49
  ("network1"- for male directors) (.67) (.66) (.12) (.66) (.66)
Network to other boards whose firm has 
female CEO 2.44 **
  ("network2"-for male directors)  (.34)
Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female CEO
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Variable
Network to other boards whose firm has 
female executives .85 *
  ("network3"- for male directors)  (.39)
Network to other boards whose firm has 
female directors .26
  ("network4"-for male directors) (.17)
Network1 (for male directors) .16
  x Three or more female directors (.21)
Network2 (for male directors) -.46
  x Three or more female directors (.57)
Network3 (for male directors) .65
  x Three or more female directors (.56)
Network4 (for male directors) .06
  x Three or more female directors (.30)
Proportion of female executives 4.33 +
  x Three or more female directors (2.63)
Proportion of top 5 female executives 
  in the industry 12.29
  x Three or more female directors (7.95)
Constant -6.31 -4.89 -4.21 -4.09 -4.74 -4.71 -6.00 -5.24
                                (3.96) (3.86) (3.85) (5.66) (4.33) (4.38) (3.97) (3.91)
Number of observations 1,096   1,096   1,096   1,096   1,096   1,096   1,096   1,096   
Log likelihood -165.07 -164.38 -159.57 -120.21 -135.73 -138.51 -162.59 -162.98
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and Models 1-7 include 2-digit industry dummies.
Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a Female CEO
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Figure 1.1. The Predicted Probability of a Women Appointed as the CEO Depending on 
the Number of Female Directors per Board 
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Figure 2.1. Interaction Effect between the Proportion of Female Directors and Male 
directors’ Board Interlock Ties to Firms Having Women at the Top (CEO, Executive, 
Director positions) on the Likelihood that a Firm Will Appoint a Woman to the CEO 
Position  
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Figure 2.2. The Difference in Probability of Appointing a Female CEO for the Interaction 
Effect of Board Interlock Ties to Firms Having Women at the Top  
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Figure 3.1. Interaction Effect between the Proportion of Female Directors and the 
Proportion of Female Executives on the Likelihood that a Firm Will Appoint a Woman to 
the CEO Position 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.006* 0.005 0.004
0.092**
0.172**
0.299**
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.1 0.2 0.3
Proportion of Female Directors 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f A
pp
oi
nt
in
g 
a 
Fe
m
al
e 
C
EO
 
Presence of female executives 
Absence of female executives 
  96 
Figure 3.2. The Difference in Probability of Appointing a Female CEO for the Interaction 
Effect of the Proportion of Female Executives 
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Figure 4.1. Interaction Effect between the Proportion of Female Directors and the 
Proportion of Females who are Top 5 Executives in the Industry which the Firm is Located 
on the Likelihood that a Firm Will Appoint a Woman to the CEO Position 
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Figure 4.2. The Difference in Probability of Appointing a Female CEO for the Interaction 
Effect of the Proportion of Females who are Top 5 Executives in the Industry which the 
Firm is Located  
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APPENDIX A: PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS 
Appendix Table A.1. Probit Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a 
Female CEO 
Variable
Log of total firm sales -.05 -.06 -.05
                                (.06) (.07) (.07)
Return on assets -.01 * -.01 * -.01 *
                                (.01) (.01) (.01)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .16 .15 .15
                                (.18) (.18) (.18)
CEO-chair duality .52 * .42 * .44 *
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.26) (.20) (.20)
CEO age .00 .00 .00
                                (.01) (.01) (.01)
CEO ownership -.62 -.64 -.57
                                (.46) (.50) (.48)
CEO tenure -.01 -.01 -.01
                                (.02) (.02) (.02)
Proportion of independent directors -1.50 + -1.30 + -1.33 +
                                (.81) (.76) (.75)
Board size -.07 -.06 -.08 +
                                (.06) (.06) (.05)
Directors' average age .02 .02 .01
                                (.01) (.03) (.03)
Board average tenure .02 .02 .02
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.03) (.03) (.03)
Gender of nomination committee chair (1=female, -1.01 -1.11 -1.18
  0=male) (.73) (.79) (.81)
Gender of the predecessor CEO (1=female, 0=male) -.25 -.25 -.67
(.74) (.74) (.76)
Number of women on major board committees  -.12 -.16 -.10
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.14) (.21) (.21)
Female-male directors' relative board tenure .12 .13 .03
                                (.33) (.43) (.28)Female-male directors' relative # of external 
directorship .12 .11 .13
 (.11) (.11) (.11)
Model 2 Model 3Model 1
 
  100 
 
Variable
Female-male directors' relative director ownership -.04 * -.04 * -.03 +
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Proportion top 5 female executives in the industry -5.28 -4.37 -4.08
  (5.48) (5.07) (5.01)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure .10 -.55 -.32
(.77) (.87) -(.47)
Network to other boards whose firm has female .00 .00 .08 **
  CEO, executives, and directors ("network1") (.31) (.31) (.32)
Proportion of female executives 5.02 ** 5.13
################################ (.58) (.59)
Proportion of female directors 2.98 **
################################ (1.14)
One female director .13
                                (.30)
Two female directors .12
                                (.37)
Three or more female directors .79 +
                                (.43)
Constant -2.32 -2.36 -2.37
################################ (2.01) (2.02) (1.90)
Number of observations 1,096         1,096         1,096         
Log likelihood -159.39 -159.43 -159.82
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and 2-digit industry dummies.
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
Model 2 Model 3Model 1
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Appendix Table A.2. Probit Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a 
Female CEO 
Variable
Log of total firm sales -.07 -.09 -.17 -.09 -.10
                                (.06) (.07) (.11) (.07) (.07)
Return on assets -.01 * -.01 * -.01 -.01 * -.01 *
                                (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .12 .14 .10 .14 .19
                                (.16) (.18) (.27) (.18) (.18)
CEO-chair duality .43 * .43 * .14 .43 * .43 *
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.20) (.20) (.33) (.20) (.20)
CEO age .00 .00 .03 .00 .00
                                (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
CEO ownership -.57 -.59 -.40 -.54 -.59
                                (.49) (.52) (.93) (.50) (.52)
CEO tenure -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01
                                (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Proportion of independent directors -1.24 -1.11 -2.52 + -1.11 -2.01
                                (.83) (.77) (1.40) (.77) (.87)
Board size -.05 -.04 -.11 -.04 -.02
                                (.05) (.05) (.08) (.05) (.05)
Directors' average age .02 .01 -.03 .01 .02
                                (.03) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.03)
Board average tenure .02 .02 .03 .02 .01
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.03) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.03)
Gender of nomination committee chair -1.08 -.98 -.21 -.97 -.98
  (1=female, 0=male) (.85) (.82) (1.43) (.62) (.82)
Gender of the predecessor CEO (1=female, -.63 -.56 -3.53 -.56 -.55
  0=male) (.72) (.79) (1.01) (.79) (.79)
Number of women on major board committees  -.14 -.16 -.30 -.16 -.15
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.21) (.22) (.37) (.22) (.22)
Female-male directors' relative board tenure -.02 -.07 .01 -.09 -.07
                                (.26) (.46) (.91) (.46) (.46)
Female-male directors' relative # of external .14 .12 -.03 .15 .12
  directorship (.12) (.11) (.25) (.11) (.11)
Female-male directors' relative director -.04 * -.04 * -.04 * -.04 * -.04 *
  ownership (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5Model1
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Variable
Proportion top 5 female executives in the -3.89 -5.49 -7.61 -7.33 -5.49
  industry (4.14) (5.16) (9.49) (4.25) (5.16)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure .05 .05 1.29 .05 .05
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (.44) (.63) (1.26) (.62) (.63)
Proportion of female executives 4.81 ** 5.21 ** 3.42 ** 4.90 ** 5.21 **
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (.59) (.59) (.92) (.48) (.59)
Proportion of female directors -12.52 -8.39 -19.560* -12.39 8.39
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (7.45) (5.69) (8.84) (9.69) (5.69)
Network to other boards whose firm has female .38 .75 +
  CEO, executives, and directors ("network1") (.42) (.39)
Network to other boards whose firm has female 2.15 **
  CEO ("network2") (.61)
Network to other boards whose firm has female -0.528
  executives ("network3") (.39)
Network to other boards whose firm has female .75 +
  directors ("network4") (.39)
Network1 x Proportion of female directors 11.50 *
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (5.59)
Network2 x Proportion of female directors  19.53 *
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (8.38)
Network3 x Proportion of female directors  11.49 *
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (5.56)
Network4 x Proportion of female directors  9.49 *
(4.59)
Constant -3.01 -2.01 .63 -2.01 -3.78
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2.48) (1.98) (3.23) (1.98) (2.12)
Number of observations 1,096     1,096     1,096     1,096   1,096     
Log likelihood -162.02 -155.78 -75.45 -155.78 -152.54
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and 2-digit industry dummies.
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5Model1
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Appendix Table A.3. Probit Regression Results Predicting the Probability of Appointing a 
Female CEO 
Variable
Log of total firm sales -.06 -.04 -.05
                                (.07) (.07) (.07)
Return on assets -.01 * -.01 * -.01 *
                                (.01) (.01) (.01)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .15 .13 .19
                                (.18) (.18) (.17)
CEO-chair duality .42 * .41 * .41 *
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.20) (.20) (.20)
CEO age .00 -.01 -.01
                                (.01) (.01) (.01)
CEO ownership -63.83 -69.10 -66.55
                                (49.70) (52.32) (51.98)
CEO tenure -.01 .00 -.01
                                (.02) (.02) (.02)
Proportion of independent directors -1.30 + -1.28 + -1.25
                                (.76) (.75) (.76)
Board size -.06 -.05 -.05
                                (.06) (.05) (.05)
Directors' average age .02 .03 .03
                                (.03) (.03) (.03)
Board average tenure .02 .01 .02
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.03) (.03) (.03)
Gender of nomination committee chair (1=female, -1.11 -1.26 -.89
   0=male) (.79) (.83) (.72)
Gender of the predecessor CEO (1=female, 0=male) -.25 -.56 -.36
(.74) (.77) (.71)
Number of women on major board committees  -.16 -.16 -.14
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.21) (.22) (.22)
Female-male directors' relative board tenure .13 .08 .05
                                (.43) (.44) (.44)
Female-male directors' relative # of external directorship .11 .12 .11
(.11) (.11) (.11)
Female-male directors' relative director ownership -.04 * -.06 * -.04 *
  (.02) (.02) (.02)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Variable
Proportion top 5 female executives in the industry -4.37 -3.77 -6.89 +
(5.07) (5.08) (3.92)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure -.41 -.28 -.25
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.58) (.59) (.59)
Proportion of female executives 5.02 ** 3.93 ** 5.20 **
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.58) (.90) (.59)
Proportion of female directors 2.98 ** 1.27 -.05
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (1.14) (1.59) (1.82)
Network to other boards whose firm has female .00 .06 .07
  CEO, executives, and directors ("network1") (.31) (.31) (.32)
Proportion of female executives 18.76 *
  x Proportion of female directors (8.02)
Proportion of top 5 female executives in the 3.91 *
  industry x Proportion of female directors (1.82)
Constant -2.36 -3.14 -2.88
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (2.02) (1.95) (1.85)
Number of observations 1,096         1,096         1,432         
Log likelihood -159.43 -158.77 -157.99
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and Models 1 and 2 include 2-digit 
          industry dummies.
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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APPENDIX B: COMPLEMENTARY LOG-LOG REGRESSION RESULTS 
Appendix Table B.1. Complementary log-log Results Predicting the Probability of 
Appointing a Female CEO 
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Log of total firm sales -.12 -.13 -.12
                                (.13) (.13) (.13)
Return on assets -.02 ** -.02 ** -.02 **
                                (.01) (.01) (.01)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .37 .36 .37
                                (.28) (.28) (.28)
CEO-chair duality .83 * .75 * .79 *
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.37) (.36) (.36)
CEO age .00 .00 -.01
                                (.03) (.03) (.03)
CEO ownership -.83 -.84 -.72
                                (.79) (.79) (.77)
CEO tenure .00 .00 .00
                                (.03) (.03) (.03)
Proportion of independent directors -1.18 -1.29 -1.52
                                (1.38) (1.40) (1.37)
Board size -.10 -.10 -.14
                                (.11) (.11) (.09)
Directors' average age .00 .01 .02
                                (.05) (.05) (.05)
Board average tenure .07 .06 .07
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.06) (.06) (.06)
Gender of nomination committee chair    (1=female,  -.96 -.98 -.86
   0=male)  (.67) (.68) (.68)
Gender of the predecessor CEO (1=female, 0=male) -.35 -.56 -.55
(.55) (.65) (.63)
Number of women on major board committees  -.32 -.40 -.34
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.35) (.37) (.38)
Female-male directors' relative board tenure .54 .55 .22
                                (.69) (.70) (.47)
Female-male directors' relative # of external .27 .25 .28
  directorship (.19) (.18) (.19)
Model 3
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Variable Model 1 Model 2
Female-male directors' relative director ownership -.06 ** -.06 ** -.05
  (.02) (.02) (.02)
Proportion top 5 female executives in the industry -8.36 -7.28 -7.57
 (8.26) (8.55) (8.57)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure -.87 -.88 -.03
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (1.01) (1.02) (1.28)
Network to other boards whose firm has female .39 .43 .62
  CEO, executives, and directors ("network1") (.57) (.62) (.62)
Proportion of female executives 9.52 ** 8.55 ** 8.65 **
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.99) (.98) (.99)
Proportion of female directors 5.65 **
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (1.99)
One female director .45
                                (.56)
Two female directors .47
                                (.65)
Three or more female directors 1.67 *
                                (.75)
Constant -2.72 -4.67 -5.18
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (3.75) (3.75) (3.48)
Number of observations 1,096         1,096         1,096         
Log likelihood -160.36 -160.48 -160.81
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and 2-digit industry dummies.
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
Model 3
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Appendix Table B.2. Complementary log-log Results Predicting the Probability of 
Appointing a Female CEO 
Variable
Log of total firm sales -.13 -.16 -.17 -.16 -.12
                                (.13) (.13) (.17) (.13) (.13)
Return on assets -.02 ** -.02 ** -.02 -.02 ** -.02 **
                                (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .36 .36 .29 .36 .37
                                (.28) (.29) (.42) (.29) (.28)
CEO-chair duality .75 * .76 * .39 .76 * .79 *
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.36) (.36) (.47) (.36) (.36)
CEO age .00 .00 .03 .00 -.01
                                (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03)
CEO ownership -.84 -.77 -.87 -.77 -.72
                                (.79) (.80) (1.50) (.80) (.77)
CEO tenure .00 -.01 -.02 -.01 .00
                                (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Proportion of independent directors -1.29 -1.23 -2.41 -1.23 -1.52
                                (1.40) (1.39) (2.17) (1.39) (1.37)
Board size -.10 -.06 -.21 + -.06 -.14
                                (.11) (.08) (.13) (.08) (.09)
Directors' average age .01 -.01 -.06 -.01 .02
                                (.05) (.05) (.08) (.05) (.05)
Board average tenure .06 .07 .11 .07 .07
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.06) (.06) (.08) (.06) (.06)
Gender of nomination committee chair    -.98 -.68 -.31 -.68 -.86
  (1=female,  0=male) (.68) (.69) (1.13) (.69) (.68)
Gender of the predecessor CEO (1=female, -.56 -.59 -2.30 ** -.59 -.55
   0=male) (.65) (.65) (.71) (.65) (.63)
Number of women on major board -.40 -.37 -.50 -.37 -.34
  committees  (.37) (.37) (.51) (.37) (.38)
Female-male directors' relative board tenure .55 .28 .00 .28 .22
                                (.70) (.74) (1.15) (.74) (.47)
Female-male directors' relative # of .25 .27 .00 .27 .28
  external directorship (.18) (.18) (.35) (.18) (.19)
Female-male directors' relative director -.06 ** -.06 ** -.05 + -.06 ** -.05
  ownership (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Variable
Proportion top 5 female executives in -7.28 -9.49 -3.71 -9.49 -7.57
  the industry (8.55) (8.86) (12.58) (8.86) (8.57)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure -.88 -.16 2.09 -.16 -.03
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (1.02) (1.08) (1.71) (1.08) (1.28)
Proportion of female executives 8.55 ** 8.77 ** 5.19 ** 8.77 8.65 **
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (.98) (1.00) (1.29) (1.00) (.99)
Proportion of female directors 5.65 ** -13.19 -35.32 * -12.19 -12.14
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (1.99) (11.04) (15.65) (11.77) (11.20)
Network to other boards whose firm has female .43 -1.02
  CEO, executives, and directors ("network1") (.62) (.78)
Network to other boards whose firm has female 3.42 **
  CEO ("network2") (.95)
Network to other boards whose firm has female -1.05
  executives ("network3") (.79)
Network to other boards whose firm has female 2.87 +
  directors ("network4") (1.73)
Network1 x Proportion of female directors 18.90 +
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (10.91)
Network2 x Proportion of female directors  34.35 *
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (15.24)
Network3 x Proportion of female directors  18.72 +
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (10.64)
Network4 x Proportion of female directors 17.54 +
(10.23)
Constant -4.67 -3.28 -.29 -3.28 -5.18
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (3.75) (3.58) (5.30) (3.58) (3.48)
Number of observations 1,096   1,096   1,096     1,096   1,096   
Log likelihood -160.48 -158.01 -157.79 -158.01 -160.81
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and 2-digit industry dummies.
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Appendix Table B.3. Complementary log-log Results Predicting the Probability of 
Appointing a Female CEO 
Variable
Log of total firm sales -.13 -.08 -.25
                                (.13) (.13) (.18)
Return on assets -.02 ** -.02 ** -.02
                                (.01) (.01) (.02)
Total shareholder returns (1 year) .36 .35 .56
                                (.28) (.28) (.48)
CEO-chair duality .75 * .71 + .34
################################ (.36) (.36) (.48)
CEO age .00 -.01 .00
                                (.03) (.03) (.04)
CEO ownership -.84 -.98 -1.12
                                (.79) (.84) (1.76)
CEO tenure .00 .00 -.01
                                (.03) (.03) (.04)
Proportion of independent directors -1.29 -1.46 -1.81
                                (1.40) (1.38) (2.16)
Board size -.10 -.08 -.23
                                (.11) (.08) (.13)
Directors' average age .01 .02 .00
                                (.05) (.05) (.08)
Board average tenure .06 .06 .08
################################ (.06) (.06) (.08)
Gender of nomination committee chair (1=female, -.98 -.83 -.89
   0=male) (.68) (.69) (.72)
Gender of the predecessor CEO (1=female, 0=male) -.56 -.67 -.36 +
(.65) (.65) (.71)
Number of women on major board committees  -.40 -.43 -.24
################################ (.37) (.38) (.51)
Female-male directors' relative board tenure .55 .58 -.03
                                (.70) (.70) (1.11)
Female-male directors' relative # of external .25 .26 -.02
   directorship (.18) (.18) (.36)
Female-male directors' relative director  ownership -.06 ** -.08 ** -.06 *
(.02) (.03) (.03)
Model 3Model 1 Model 2
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Variable
Proportion top 5 female executives in the industry -7.28 -7.02 -2.00 +
(8.55) (8.59) (1.04)
Female-male directors overlapping tenure -.88 -.87 .97
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (1.02) (1.02) (1.58)
Proportion of female executives 8.55 ** 7.40 ** 6.56 **
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (.98) (1.45) (1.45)
Proportion of female directors 5.65 ** 3.49 -9.13 *
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (1.99) (2.77) (4.48)
Network to other boards whose firm has female .43 .46 .60 **
  CEO, executives, and directors ("network1") (.62) (.62) (.08)
Proportion of female executives 21.77 +
  x Proportion of female directors (12.59)
Proportion of top 5 female executives in the 10.16 *
  industry x Proportion of female directors (4.40)
Constant -4.67 -5.85 + -3.37
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" (3.75) (3.47) (5.28)
Number of observations 1,096         1,096         1,432         
Log likelihood -160.48 -160.44 -156.28
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year dummies and Models 1 and 2 include 2-digit 
         industry dummies.
+   p<0.10
*   p<0.01
** p<0.001; two-tailed tests.
Model 3Model 1 Model 2
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